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Many patents cover inventions that do not work as described. Fingers often point to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office), which is criticized for doing a poor job
of examining patents. But the story is more complicated for at least three reasons. First, the
Patent Office is at a clear disadvantage from an information standpoint. Inventors have
little incentive to disclose failure because it might compromise patentability. Second, an
inventor is not required to actually make everything that is claimed (or verify that everything
that is claimed actually works) before filing a patent application. Third, inventors have an
incentive to file patent applications early in the inventive process. Often, filing occurs during
the initial stages of research and development, before much experimentation has been done
and when the level of uncertainty is high. Together, these factors set the stage for an issued
patent covering subject matter that does not work as described.
Of course, inventors continue to experiment during the years of patent examination.
This additional experimentation inevitably reveals more information about the invention
than the inventor knew at the time of filing, including if any of the claimed subject matter
fails to work as described in the patent application. This raises an important issue that has
been overlooked by both courts and scholars: When post-filing experimentation reveals that
some of the claimed subject matter does not work, is there a duty to act? This Article argues
when failure comes to light the inventor has a legal obligation to, at a minimum, amend the
claims. It then explains how to encourage inventors to disclose details about the failure in the
patent record. This additional disclosure would have several upsides for the inventor: it
would improve patent (examination) quality, enrich the public storehouse of technical
knowledge, and promote the broader goals of the patent system.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) is often criticized
for issuing a large number of questionable, “bad,” or low-quality patents.1
Patent quality can be defined as “the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or
exceed) the statutory standards of patentability—most importantly, to [cover
1 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE (2008); DAN L.
BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009);
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004).
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inventions which are] novel, nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently
described.”2 Famous examples of questionable patents include a motorized ice
cream cone,3 a method of exercising a cat with a laser pointer,4 a snake leash,5
and a “high-five” machine.6 Aside from being technically invalid,7 these patents
impose costs on the legal system, competitors, would-be inventors, and society.8
The quality of an issued patent depends on the quality of the underlying
examination.9 The assurance of a high-quality patent examination is largely
about information10: an examiner must have all of the relevant technical
information in hand in order to accurately gauge patentability. When the
issue is whether the invention works as described, the question becomes one
of enablement, the statutory requirement that an invention be sufficiently
disclosed to allow a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)11 to
make and use it without undue experimentation.12 From an information
standpoint, the Patent Office is at a clear disadvantage because the inventor
2 R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138
(2009); cf. Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3092-93 (2014)
(defining “low-quality” or “bad” patents as those “which carve out of the public domain and deter
others from practicing inventions that are in some way undeserving of patent protection”). The
patentability requirements appear in Title 35 of the United States Code. Briefly, the claimed
invention must be useful, novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101–103 (2012). In addition, the application must adequately describe, enable, and set forth the
best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention and conclude with claims that delineate the
invention with particularity. Id. § 112(a)–(b).
3 Motorized Ice Cream Cone, U.S. Patent No. 5,971,829 (filed Mar. 6, 1998).
4 Method of Exercising a Cat, U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993).
5 Collar Apparatus Enabling Secure Handling of a Snake by Tether, U.S. Patent No. 6,490,999
(filed Aug. 29, 2001).
6 Apparatus for Simulating a “High-Five,” U.S. Patent No. 5,356,330 (filed Dec. 7, 1993).
7 Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (“A poor
quality or questionable patent is one that is likely invalid or contains claims that are overly broad.”).
8 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1515 (2001); Christopher
R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 113-39 (2006).
9 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
10 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 723, 748 (2009) (“The assurance of good patent quality is all about information . . . .”).
11 The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent person
in torts. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Factors relevant to
constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophistication of the technology,
the educational level of the inventor, the educational level of active workers in the field, the types of
problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which
innovations are made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
12 The patent document must “contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to
make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Although the term “undue
experimentation” does not appear in the statute, “it is well established that enablement requires that
the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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has little incentive to disclose failure or any experimental data that might
compromise patentability.13 And since the Patent Office lacks its own testing
facilities, it must rely on information presented by the inventor.14 This
information asymmetry inevitably allows nonenabled patents to slip through
the cracks and further contributes to the patent quality problem.15
But other factors contribute to the proliferation of nonenabled patents. First,
an inventor is not required to actually make everything that is claimed (or verify
that everything that is claimed actually works) before filing a patent application.
As discussed below, an inventor can satisfy enablement with so-called “prophetic”
examples.16 Second, for a variety of reasons, applicants have an incentive to file
patent applications early in the inventive process.17 In fields like chemistry,
biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals, this means filing during the initial stages of
research and development before much experimentation has been done and the
level of uncertainty is high. Together, these factors set the stage for an issued
patent covering subject matter that does not work as described.18
Of course, inventors who file early continue to experiment during the
years of patent prosecution.19 Post-filing experimentation inevitably reveals
more information about the invention than the inventor knew at the time of
filing, including if any of the claimed embodiments20 fails to work as
described in the patent application. This raises an important issue that has
been overlooked by both courts and commentators: When post-filing
experimentation during patent prosecution reveals that some of the claimed
subject matter fails to work as described, is there a duty to amend the patent
document or disclose the failure to the Patent Office?

13 No one actually believes that everything that the inventor knows about the invention ends
up before the examiner. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT
LAW 579 (4th ed. 2015) (“Experience teaches . . . that applicant obligations of candor may be
tempered by the great incentive they possess not to disclose information that might deleteriously
impact their prospective patent rights.”).
14 See discussion infra Part II.
15 Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 986 (2016) [hereinafter
Seymore, Patent Asymmetries].
16 See infra Section I.B.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 36–40.
18 See infra Section I.A.
19 The process of obtaining a patent—where the inventor or his or her agent or attorney files
an application with the Patent Office—is called patent prosecution. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT
LAW ESSENTIALS 37 (4th ed. 2013). For fiscal year 2016, the average total pendency—the time it
takes to prosecute an application from filing the first patent document to issuance—was 25.3 months.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2016, at 3 (2016).
20 An “embodiment” is a concrete, physical form of an invention described in a patent
application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (7th ed. 2017).
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To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose an inventor at
a drug company seeks to make a class of drugs to successfully treat arthritis.
Having made one compound, W, which shows promising results, the inventor
hypothesizes that structurally similar compounds X, Y, and Z (which have not
been made) will exhibit the same or better efficacy. So the drug company files
a patent application which: (1) discloses actual details about W; (2) discloses
prophetic details about X, Y, and Z; and (3) claims W, X, Y, and Z and a method
of treating arthritis by administering a therapeutically effective amount of the
respective compound to a patient. But post-filing experimentation during the
application’s pendency21 reveals that while W and X work as described, Y has
no effect on arthritis and Z cannot be made. Thus, Y and Z are nonenabled.
It is unclear how the drug company should proceed. The options include:
(1) amending the written description of the invention22 to delete details about
the “inoperative” embodiments Y and Z;23
(2) amending the claim(s) to cancel the nonenabled subject matter; or
(3) remaining silent and allowing the patent (application) to issue as it was
initially filed, thereby concealing the failure.

As the discussion below will show, the relevant law is not as clear-cut as
one might hope. First, a patent applicant owes the Patent Office a duty of
candor, a duty of good faith, and a duty to disclose all information material
to patentability.24 A breach of this duty is considered inequitable conduct or
fraud on the Patent Office and renders the patent unenforceable.25 Second,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit26 has reiterated that
“[c]laims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, [a
PHOSITA] could not practice their full scope without undue

21 Patent pendency refers to the length of time between filing the patent application and patent
issuance. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 48 (4th ed. 2017).
22 The written description is the part of the patent document that completely describes the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description . . . . It shall
conclude with one or more claims . . . .”). Although I will not discuss it in this Article, it is worth noting
that the terms “written description” and “specification” are often used interchangeably (and mistakenly)
in patent law. F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 155 n.4 (5th ed. 2011).
23 An inoperative embodiment either cannot be made or does not work as described. Thus, a
claim that encompasses inoperative embodiments raises an enablement issue. Crown Operations
Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia, 289 F.3d 1367, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
24 See infra Section II.A.
25 See infra Section II.A.
26 The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office and district court
cases arising under the patent laws. The court was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982. See infra note 28.
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experimentation.”27 In theory, this should provide an incentive for the drug
company to address the failure during patent prosecution because the claim
would be vulnerable to an invalidity attack, or the defense of inequitable
conduct, if it were ever asserted in patent infringement litigation. Third,
notwithstanding the previous point, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor
court, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)28 have held
that a claim which includes some inoperative embodiments is not necessarily
invalid for nonenablement.29 This arguably provides an escape hatch for
inventors who learn about failure during patent application pendency.
There is every reason to believe that concealment of inoperability is
pervasive, thereby producing a countless number of issued patents which
disclose and claim failure. This problem not only contributes to the
proliferation of nonenabled (and thus low-quality) patents, but has far-reaching
implications for the patent system. This Article argues that an applicant who
learns about experimental failure during patent prosecution has a legal
obligation to, at the very least, amend the claims.30 It then explains how to
encourage inventors to disclose details about the failure in the patent record.31
This additional disclosure would have several upsides for the inventor,32
improve patent (examination) quality,33 enrich the public storehouse of
technical knowledge,34 and promote broader goals of the patent system.35
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the
patenting of underdeveloped inventions. It explains why the patent system
allows (if not encourages) inventors to do so despite the high likelihood that
some of the claimed subject matter might not work as described. Part II
examines experimental failure and the costs of nondisclosure on the
scientific community and the patent system. In Part III, I argue that despite
the murkiness of the relevant case law, a patent applicant cannot conceal
known failure without breaching a duty of candor and good faith owed to
the Patent Office. Next, Part IV explains how a patent applicant who learns
27 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)
(quoting MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
28 The C.C.P.A. was a five-judge Article III appellate court on the same level as the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See Pub.
L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its
creation, the Federal Circuit adopted C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. See South Corp.
v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
29 See infra Section III.B.
30 See infra Parts III and IV.
31 See infra Part V.
32 See infra Section V.B.
33 See infra subsection V.C.1.
34 For a discussion of the storehouse, see infra note 55. See also infra Section II.B. (explaining
the role of failure in knowledge building).
35 See infra subsection V.C.2.
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about experimental failure after filing can claim around it. Finally, Part V
explains how to encourage inventors to disclose information about failure
in the patent record. It explores why incentivizing such post-filing
disclosures has several upsides for the patent system, including improved
patent (examination) quality and furthering the broader goal of promoting
technological progress.
I. PATENTING UNDERDEVELOPED INVENTIONS
While all would agree that issuing nonenabled patents is far from ideal,
their proliferation is not surprising given that “the patent law[s] place[]
strong pressure on filing the patent application early in the development of
the technology, often before . . . all of the boundaries [are] fully explored.”36
Indeed, inventors must often file before actually reducing the invention to
practice in order to attract investors,37 minimize risk,38 and to safeguard
patent rights in the United States and abroad.39
Nevertheless, the pressure to file early essentially invites inventors to seek
patents on underdeveloped inventions. This regime inevitably produces
nonenabled patents which disclose and claim failure.

36 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis added), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also Edmund
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267-71 (1977) [hereinafter
Kitch, Nature and Function] (explaining the rules in patent law that force and permit early filing).
37 It is axiomatic in patent law that many inventors must rely on investors to cover the hefty
costs of patent procurement and commercialization. See JOHN SAMSON, INVENTIONS AND THEIR
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 51 (1896) (“To have the use of capital is nearly always
indispensable for the development of an invention, and, unless the inventor is of that fortunate class
who have the means to work their own patents, he must appeal for support to one or more people
with money.”); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143-44 (2000) (discussing the importance of patents as tools to attract
venture capital financing); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND.
L.J. 759, 759 (1999) (“The prospect of certainty in the patentee’s property interest has several
benefits, one of which is to create a sense of security which permits the patentee to secure risk capital
from investors, which in turn facilitates the commercialization of the claimed invention.”).
38 See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 393-94 (2010) (“If
building a prototype is costly—take, for example, fabricating a new type of computer chip—the risks
of not securing a patent [before actual reduction to practice] may be too large to justify doing so.”).
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (encouraging diligence by penalizing inventors for the delayed
filing of patent applications); Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272 (invoking an absolute novelty requirement which regards any pre-filing
disclosure, including activity by the inventor, as patent defeating).
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A. Claiming the Unproven
An inventor can obtain a patent without actually making and testing
everything that is claimed.40 It is well settled in U.S. patent law that the
mental act of conception of the idea, rather than any physical act, is the
important facet of the inventive process.41 Thus, an applicant who
“constructively” reduces an invention to practice by filing a patent application
which describes the invention presumably has complied with the disclosure
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), including enablement.42
Constructive reduction to practice plays a unique role in patent law, as
Judge Pauline Newman describes:
[It] is a legal status unique to the patent art. Unlike the rules for scientific
publications, which require actual performance of every experimental detail,
patent law and practice are directed to teaching the invention so that it can
be practiced. The inclusion of constructed examples in a patent application is
an established method of providing the technical content needed to support
the conceived scope of the invention.43

The basic tenet of constructive reduction to practice is that “[t]he
invention disclosed in the patent application must be capable of actually
working in the real world if it were built, but the inventor herself need not
have yet built it, practiced it, or otherwise made it work in the real world.”44
40 See In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (ruling that inventors are “not
required to disclose every species encompassed by their claims); see also In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d
457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (“The mere fact that something has not previously been done clearly is
not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications purporting to disclose how to do it.”).
Indeed, patent law “explicitly assumes the need for more experimentation after filing to
actually implement the invention.” Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent
Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93 (2009) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Cotropia, Early Filing].
41 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1998). The inventive process requires two acts:
conception and reduction to practice. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS 116 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890). Conception, often referred to as the
“touchstone” of inventorship, is the “formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.”
Id. at 532; accord Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
42 Reduction to practice occurs when the inventor either makes the invention and establishes
that it works for its intended purpose or files a patent application which describes the invention in
sufficient detail to satisfy the disclosure requirements of § 112(a), including the “how to make” prong
of enablement. See In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“[T]he disclosure must be such as
will give possession of the invention to the person of ordinary skill.”); see also Yasuko Kawai v.
Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[C]onstructive reduction to practice . . . requires
that there be sufficient disclosure in the specification to enable any person skilled in the art to take
advantage of that utility where it would not be obvious how this is done.”).
43 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
44 John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1366 (2013).

2018]

Patenting Around Failure

1147

Yet, courts acknowledge that the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice is
legal fiction.45 Clearly the inventor is speculating or even guessing about
embodiments that have not been made.46 Nonetheless, “the underlying
assumption in patent law is that the inventor ‘has’ the invention mentally, and so
can give a sufficiently detailed description of that inventive conception—[thus]
physically creating the invention is straightforward.”47
Since the doctrine is legal fiction, it is not surprising that constructive
reduction to practice has several inherent problems. First, some inventions
cannot be constructively reduced to practice because they require confirmation
through experiment.48 For example, it is often true that in “unpredictable” fields
like chemistry, biotechnology, and pharmacology,49 a patent that lacks a
substantial number of working examples runs a high risk of nonenablement.50
This is because a PHOSITA must often use trial and error—and perhaps engage
in undue experimentation—to figure out how to practice the full scope of the
claimed invention.51 Second, by not requiring that the inventor have a fully
developed and tested invention at the time of filing, the resulting patent will
probably be too broad in scope. Put another way, the patent will likely protect
45 See, e.g., Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Even the
act of publication or the fiction of constructive reduction to practice will not suffice if the disclosure
[is inadequate].” (quoting Borst, 345 F.2d at 855)). Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit regularly
reiterates that constructive reduction to practice is an established method of disclosure, even in the
experimental sciences. See Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Univ. of
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
46 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1174 n.77 (2002) (“Of course, in the case of constructive reduction to practice . . . the
inventor is in some sense speculating or guessing about the features on an invention not yet built.”).
47 Id.
48 Courts have long recognized the differences between something like a simple mechanical
device and a chemical compound. See, e.g., Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868) (“Now a
machine which consists of a combination of devices is the subject of invention, and its effects may be
calculated a priori, while a discovery of a new substance by means of chemical combinations of known
materials is empirical and discovered by experiment.”); Naylor v. Alsop Process Co., 168 F. 911, 919
(8th Cir. 1909) (“It should also be borne in mind in considering this subject that reasoning by analogy
in a complex field like chemistry is very much more restricted than in a simple field like mechanics.”).
49 Enablement depends on the nature of the technology. Inventions are often said to emerge from
“unpredictable” or “predictable” fields. The courts refer to chemistry, biotechnology, and related
experimental fields as “unpredictable” because PHOSITAs in these fields often cannot predict whether
a reaction protocol that works for one embodiment will work for others. Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg,
Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the chemical arts,
“a slight variation . . . can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at all”). By contrast, applied
technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often regarded as “predictable” arts because
they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
50 See, e.g., In re Prutton, 200 F.2d 706, 712 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that claims to a class of
chemical compounds, which were sufficiently broad to involve some speculation, lacked enablement
despite the presence of specific examples within the class).
51 Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 644-45
(2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function].
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speculative ideas as opposed to subject matter that is truly enabled.52 Third,
these patents can create insurmountable roadblocks (intentionally or not)53 for
others with meritorious inventions.54 Finally, the disclosure of unproven ideas
arguably adds little or nothing to the public storehouse of knowledge.55
B. Prophetic Examples
Since an applicant’s compliance with § 112(a) does not turn on the amount
of actual pre-filing experimentation done,56 the courts allow inventors to
satisfy enablement in other ways. These include the use of prophetic
examples, which Timothy Holbrook defines as “forms of the invention that
the patentee did not actually invent but which would be within the scope of
her disclosure.”57 A patent supported with prophetic examples does not
52 Cf. Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion”
Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 453 (2007) (explaining that
the lack of a requirement for an inventor to “actually have a complete and operative invention . . . [at
the time of filing increases the] potential that the [claims] will protect speculative ideas . . . . With just
a little time, money, and imagination, one may [obtain a patent] . . . without inventing anything . . . .”).
53 For instance, so-called “nuisance” prior art describing an unworkable invention “can . . . be
generated as a result of a bona fide attempt at a constructive reduction to practice that for some
unexpected reason fails to work as disclosed.” David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior
Art, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 221, 223-24 (1999). Innocuously disclosed information
which has the same effect is often described as “technical junk.” Id. at 222, 223 n.3.
54 A good example is when an early filer strategically drafts claims which cover undeveloped
technology. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 67 (arguing that the practice “penalizes real innovators
who operate in the shadow of early, broad claims”); Wainwright, supra note 53, at 222 (explaining how
nuisance prior art can discourage applicants to the point of abandoning their patent applications); see also
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1975 (2005) (exploring the practice and discussing how patent
prosecutors draft claims to “mitigate problems with language and later-developed technology”).
55 See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring)
(explaining that the full and complete disclosure of how to make and use the claimed invention “adds
a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse”); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Ready for
Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2016) (explaining that patents which lack technical detail and
experimental results because nothing has been made are unhelpful to scientists).
56 See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that there is no statutory
basis for a “working example” requirement); In re Long, 368 F.2d 892, 894-95 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
(emphasizing that there is no “specific embodiment” requirement).
57 Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 158 (2006) [hereinafter
Holbrook, Possession]; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(p) (9th ed. 8th rev., Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP] (permitting
the use of prophetic examples). A key benefit of prophetic examples is their use in provisional patent
applications. A provisional application allows an applicant to obtain an early filing date for the
invention before the applicant is ready to draft a claim or a full application. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)
(2012) (allowing a provisional application, in which no claim is required). But the provisional
application must satisfy the disclosure requirements of § 112(a), including enablement. See New
Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Such a
provisional application need only include a specification conforming to the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112 and at least one drawing filed under § 113; no claims are required.”).
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necessarily raise any red flags with respect to (non)enablement.58 In fact, the
Federal Circuit is quite receptive to them:
[A] patent does not need to guarantee that the invention works for a claim to be
enabled. It is well settled that an invention may be patented before it is actually
reduced to practice. . . . Similarly, a patentee is not required to provide actual
working examples; we have rejected enablement challenges based on the theory
that there can be no guarantee that prophetic examples actually work . . . .59

Yet prophetic examples have several serious drawbacks. First, they are often
less helpful than working examples, particularly in the unpredictable fields
discussed above.60 For example, in chemistry a PHOSITA often cannot take a
result from one reaction and predict how similar compounds will react with any
reasonable expectation of success.61 This is true, as illustrated in the hypothetical
set forth in the Introduction,62 because minor changes in chemical structure can
result in large changes in reactivity.63 Second, the mere ability to craft prophetic
examples does not mean that the inventor necessarily possesses the (full scope of
the) invention.64 Third, and relatedly, it is almost inevitable that some of the
prophetically claimed subject matter will not work as described—particularly in

58 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Patentees
must set forth prophetic examples in the present tense to signal that they were not carried out. Schering Corp. v.
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1376 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1578).
59 Alcon Res. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Pfaff v. Wells
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 61 (1998)); cf. In re Anderson, 471 F.2d 1237, 1240-41 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(explaining that since § 112 does not require a specific example for everything encompassed by a
claim, the Patent Office cannot limit the scope of a claim to the specific examples disclosed).
60 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61 See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127,
144-46 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement] (emphasizing that, in chemistry, the
“array of chemical compounds which are structurally similar may differ radically in their
properties”); cf. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (testing enablement by
determining if a skilled scientist working with RNA viruses would have reasonably believed that the
inventor’s success with the described embodiment(s) “could be extrapolated with a reasonable
expectation of success” to other embodiments encompassed by the claims).
62 See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
63 The courts recognized long ago that chemical compounds similar in structure can differ
radically in their properties, even when they belong to the same chemical class. If an applicant seeks
to claim the class, “it must appear in the [written description] . . . that the chemicals or chemical
combinations included therein [are] generally capable of accomplishing the desired result.” In re
Walker, 70 F.2d 1008, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See Holbrook, Possession, supra note 57, at 146 (“One could describe an idea but not necessarily
truly be in possession of it.”). The question of possession is closely tied to enablement. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has observed that “a recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full
breadth of the claim is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of
the invention.” LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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unpredictable fields.65 As noted above, this can frustrate the efforts of other
researchers who can actually enable the prophetically-claimed invention.66
C. The Role of Enablement
In theory, a patent that claims failure is invalid.67 To be sure, “an applicant
cannot possibly enable a PHOSITA to practice an invention that does not
work.”68 To understand why, it necessary to briefly explain enablement and
the role it plays in patent law.
Enablement is the patentability requirement which “lies at the heart of the
patent bargain.”69 By compelling an applicant to prepare a written description of
the invention70 sufficient to teach a PHOSITA how to make and use it without
undue experimentation,71 enablement ensures that the applicant’s disclosure
sufficiently enriches the public storehouse of technical knowledge72 and that the
public will get complete possession of the invention once the patent expires.73 It
polices claim scope74 and safeguards patent law’s disclosure function.75

65
66
67

Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 51, at 632.
See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text. But there is a place for experimental failure in
patent law. I have argued elsewhere that including information about failure in the patent document
supports patent law’s disclosure function. See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2041, 2048 (2012) (proposing the creation of nonexclusionary patent documents known as
“null patents” which would disseminate technical information harvested from failed experiments).
Gideon Parchomovsky and Michael Mattioli have proposed an alternative, opt-in type of patent that
requires the disclosure of all research results (including experimental failure) as a precondition for
issuance. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207,
229-33 (2011) (“Information about failed research attempts can be just as valuable to fellow
researchers as the details of successes.”).
68 Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1501 (2011).
69 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2012); cf. LizardTech, 424 F.3d at
1344-45 (describing enablement as the essential aspect of the patent bargain).
70 See supra note 22.
71 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 55; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining
that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the “general
store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate ideas and promote technological development).
73 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822).
74 Claim scope is the “technological territory” that the inventor claims is his or hers to control. Robert
P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844
(1990). The enablement provided in the patent document serves as a constraint on claim scope. O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1854); see also Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc.,
166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that enablement’s purpose is to “ensure[] that the public knowledge
is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims”). The
scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the written description plus a PHOSITA’s knowledge. Id.
75 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 4, at 3-4.
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Enablement is a standard.76 Determining whether a disclosure was enabling as
of its filing date77 is a legal conclusion that rests on underlying factual inquiries.78
The Federal Circuit set forth several factors relevant to the enablement analysis
in In re Wands.79 They are: (1) the amount of direction or guidance presented in
the disclosure, (2) the existence of working examples, (3) the nature of the
invention, (4) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, (5) the PHOSITA’s
level of skill, (6) the state of the prior art (preexisting knowledge and technology
already available to the public80), (7) the breadth of the claims, and (8) the quantity
of experimentation necessary to practice the claimed invention.81 While not
mandatory,82 the Wands factors are ubiquitous in evaluating enablement83—
probably because they touch on issues that are important in virtually all
enablement determinations.84 These include issues related to the technical scope
and substance of the disclosure (factors one and two),85 the nature of the
technology (factors three and four),86 the PHOSITA’s knowledge and skill (factor
five),87 and the scope of the claim sought (factor seven).88
Given that a principal goal of enablement is to ensure that a PHOSITA
can practice the invention as broadly as it is claimed,89 a robust enablement
analysis should—at least in theory—ferret out inoperative embodiments.
However, the Wands factors show that enablement is an information-

76 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (concluding that enablement does not require specific exclusion of inoperative combinations for
claims to remain valid); Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 61, at 130 (noting that current
framework flexibility may allow broad claims to be enabled by even trivial amounts of disclosure).
77 MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“The enablement determination proceeds as of the effective filing date of the patent.”).
78 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
79 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
80 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(defining prior art) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). For a deeper discussion
of prior art and its use in gauging patentability, see infra note 271 and accompanying text.
81 Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (factors reordered from original text).
82 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the
Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
83 See 3 CHISUM, supra note 69, § 7.03 (collecting cases).
84 The Wands factors are interrelated. For example, if the PHOSITA is knowledgeable (factor five),
an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already knows or can easily figure out (factors one
and two). See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that
moly-manganese brazing, a well-known technique at the time of filing, did not need to be disclosed.).
85 The two factors are clustered together because working examples are a form of guidance.
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 51, at 641-46 (describing the importance of working examples
in teaching innovators in the field and therefore limiting claim scope).
86 See supra note 49 (discussing predictable and unpredictable technologies).
87 This factor has become increasingly important over the past decade as the Federal Circuit has
compelled patentees to enable the full scope of the claimed invention. See infra notes 204 and 205.
88 Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. See supra note 74.
89 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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demanding inquiry that intensifies as the subject matter becomes more
complex.90 Still, since the Patent Office lacks its own testing facilities and has
no way to verify if the claimed subject matter actually works, the robustness
of the enablement analysis is limited by information provided by the
applicant during patent prosecution.91 As such, to the extent that the Patent
Office suffers from an information deficit, the agency will inevitably issue
patents that disclose and claim failure. If post-filing experimentation has been
done, this problem can be mitigated because applicants now know more about
which embodiments work and which ones are inoperative. As discussed
below, the challenge is to get this knowledge into the examiner’s hands.92
II. UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENTAL FAILURE
A. The Ubiquity of Failure in Science
Failure abounds in scientific research.93 An experiment fails when it does not
produce the expected outcome.94 This can happen because of poor experimental
design, sloppy research technique, a flawed hypothesis, or for reasons unknown:
No matter how well understood the theories leading up to the experiments
are or how well-designed those experiments are or how carefully the
experiments are done, the end result often is nothing like what was expected.
The results can be thought of as failures or as a learning that the plan was
based on an unknown flaw. Experimental science delves into the unknown,
so the work beforehand is a best guess at what might be. Sometimes these

90 Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 67 (2010) (noting that long lists of
factors can raise information costs instead of reducing them). To be sure, it is easier to gauge enablement
in simple inventions like paper clips and broom rakes than in more complex inventions like chemical
compounds. Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 1019 (2013).
91 See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
92 See infra Section II.A.
93 STUART FIRESTEIN, FAILURE: WHY SCIENCE IS SO SUCCESSFUL 41 (2015) (explaining that
“failure is the default” in scientific research because “[t]here are many more ways to fail than to succeed”).
Here I should distinguish failure from mistake—the latter describing a situation where the experiment
produces the correct outcome but the result is misidentified due to a misunderstanding of the relevant
science. See Cubist Pharms., Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 805 F.3d 1112, 1115-19 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding the
Patent Office’s decision to issue a certificate of correction for a patent which misidentified a chemical
structure because it was universally believed at the time of filing that the misidentified structure was
proper and that the post-issuance correction did not broaden the scope of the claims).
94 See Jonathan Knight, Null and Void, 422 NATURE 554, 554-55 (2003) (investigating the fate
of negative results). In this Article, the terms negative results and failed experiment are used
interchangeably to include experiments that do not work as planned.
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best guesses end up being totally wrong and the series of experiments yield
nothing other than the fact that there is something unexplained.95

Regardless of the cause, in science it is often the case that experiments do
not work as planned.96 In fact, negative results comprise the bulk of
knowledge produced in scientific research.97
B. The File Drawer Problem
The problem with data generated from failed experiments is that most of
it is never disclosed.98 Negative results comprise 10–30% of the published
scientific literature, depending on the technical field.99 This is true even
though failure plays a key role in knowledge building100 and forces researchers
to think critically and (re)evaluate current thinking.101 The practice of
nondisclosure is often called the “file drawer problem”102 because it is

95 JOHN FETZER, CAREER MANAGEMENT FOR CHEMISTS: A GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN A
CHEMISTRY CAREER 14-15 (2004); see also RICHARD H. MCCUEN, THE ELEMENTS OF
ACADEMIC RESEARCH 275-77 (1996) (explaining why experiments fail). Sometimes the flaw comes
to light when an independent researcher unsuccessfully attempts to replicate the original researcher’s
results using the same experimental methods and techniques. Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s
Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 854 (2017). Irreproducibility provides “good reason to
doubt the original result, even if the prior work was subjected to the peer-review process.” Id.
96 MCCUEN, supra note 95, at 51-53; see also FETZER, supra note 95, at 15 (“[G]ood science
inherently is full of failed experiments.”). But as one commentator explains, (the risk of) failure
makes success look much better:

There is yet another, and perhaps not so obvious, way in which failure is key to the scientific
enterprise . . . . [H]ow reliable is success if there is no sufficient possibility of failure?
Success becomes more successful, and often more interesting, the harder it is to obtain, the
more likely the process that led to it could have led instead to failure.

FIRESTEIN, supra note 93, at 63-64.
97 FIRESTEIN, supra note 93, at 146; Chris Patil & Vivian Siegel, Shining a Light on Dark Data,
2 DISEASE MODELS & MECHANISMS 521, 521 (2009) (noting that scientists spend most of their
time producing unpublished negative results); see also supra note 95.
98 Cf. David Alcantara, Joe Blois & Carlos Juan Ceacero, Editorial, 1 ALL RESULTS J. BIOLOGY 1, 1
(2010), http://www.arjournals.com/index.php/Biol/article/view/40/34 [https://perma.cc/6TX3-2RQK]
(describing the “huge untapped resource of experimental data locked up in laboratory notebooks
that could be of great service to the scientific community”).
99 Trouble at the Lab, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 19, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/
21588057-scientists-think-science-self-correcting-alarming-degree-it-not-trouble [https://perma.cc/7L86NDTP].
100 See DOROTHY LEONARD-BARTON, WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE: BUILDING AND
SUSTAINING THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 119-20 (1998) (presenting stories of “failing forward” from
scientific research, which is defined as “creating forward momentum with the learning derived from failures”).
101 Natalie Matosin et al., Negativity Towards Negative Results: A Discussion of the Disconnect
Between Scientific Worth and Scientific Culture, 7 DISEASE MODELS & MECHANISMS 171, 171 (2014).
102 Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results, 86 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 638, 638 (1979) (coining the term).
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imagined that scientists bury negative results deep in their file drawers—
never to see the light of day.103
The file drawer problem has several causes. First, a researcher might be less
inclined to invest time and energy in writing up failed experiments out of a sense
that the scientific community tends to be more interested in positive findings
than negative ones.104 Second, some researchers simply do not want competitors
to know the seemingly fruitless paths that they have been exploring.105
Third, a researcher often has little incentive to disclose negative results in the
mainstream, peer-reviewed technical literature.106 A researcher writes up results
in a manuscript hoping for ultimate publication in a prestigious journal.107 And
it is no secret that in most fields, acceptance by a prestigious journal is more likely
if the results are positive—meaning that they support the experimental
hypothesis.108 So disclosing negative results runs the risk of tainting the research
project as inferior—despite the novelty and integrity of the work—or not
conforming to the reviewers’ expectations.109 Either form of publication bias
could mean the “kiss of death” for the manuscript110 or its delayed publication

103 Donald Kennedy, The Old File Drawer Problem, 305 SCIENCE 451, 451 (2004); see also 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH DESIGN 491 (Neil J. Salkind ed., 2010) (“The file drawer problem . . . arose
from the image that . . . nonsignificant results are placed in researchers’ file drawers, never to be seen by
others.”); Daniele Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical Support from US States
Data, PLoS ONE, 1 (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271
[https://perma.cc/S9ZD-PN6R] (attributing the term to the notion that unpublished “negative papers are
imagined to lie in scientists’ drawers”).
104 Knight, supra note 94, at 554; Matosin et al., supra note 101, at 171 (“Rather than approaching
a research question in a systematic manner, it seems that scientists are encouraged to pursue nonlinear lines of investigation in search of significance . . . many are known to tuck away negative
findings (the ‘file drawer’ effect) and focus on their positive outcomes.”).
105 Knight, supra note 94, at 554.
106 Peter Hernon & Candy Schwartz, Peer Review Revisited, 20 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES. 1, 1
(2006). The mechanics of peer review typically works as follows. First, the researcher submits the
work to a journal. Second, the editor of the journal sends it to one or more reviewers knowledgeable
about the problem to judge its merit (uniqueness, methodology, adequacy of research design, and
potential contribution to the field). Third, the editor makes a final publication decision.
107 Patil & Siegel, supra note 97, at 522.
108 Fanelli, supra note 103, at 1; Matosin et al., supra note 101, at 171-73.
109 David Alcantara & Rafael Prado Gotor, Editorial, 1 ALL RESULTS J. CHEMISTRY 1, 1-2 (2010),
http://www.arjournals.com/ojs/index.php/Chem/article/view/38/27 [https://perma.cc/T4UA-VT5D]
(exploring “submission bias,” which leads researchers to publish only positive results because they
“want their competitors to think they succeed at every project designed”); Stan Szpakowicz, Failure
Is an Orphan (Let’s Adopt), 36 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 157, 157-58 (2010).
110 Szpakowicz, supra note 109, at 157-58.
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and relegation to a less-prestigious journal.111 Publishing negative results in the
peer-reviewed literature can have negative career consequences.112
Nondisclosure is an even bigger problem for industrial inventors, who
publish less frequently than their academic counterparts.113 The highest
priority for them is to generate results that show commercial promise and
will ultimately find their way into a marketable product.114 Writing up
results—good or bad—is often considered too costly.115 So one might expect
these inventors to draft technical documents, including patents, with as little
information as possible.116
C. The Costs of Nondisclosure
The file drawer problem has potentially far-reaching implications for
science and patent law. All research endeavors—including failed
experiments—produce worthwhile technical information.117 Indeed,
111 Alcantara & Gotor, supra note 109, at 1 (“[P]ositive results have a better chance of being
published, are published earlier, and are published in journals with higher impact factors.”); Richard
Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED.
178, 180 (2006) (describing the bias against work that discloses negative results).
112 One commentator explains how:

Since papers reporting positive results attract more interest and are cited more often, journal editors
and peer reviewers might tend to [favor] them, which will further increase the desirability of
[publishing] a positive outcome to researchers, particularly if their careers are evaluated by counting
the number of papers listed in their CVs and the impact factor of the journals they are published in.

Fanelli, supra note 103, at 1.
113 See Benoît Godin, Research and the Practice of Publication in Industries, 25 RES. POL’Y 587,
588-90 (1996) (comparing publishing and patenting habits in industry and academia and
demonstrating that industry papers make up a small percentage of papers published).
114 Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and Technology,
in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 519, 529-30 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987).
115 Diana Hicks, Published Papers, Tacit Competencies and Corporate Management of the
Public/Private Character of Knowledge, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 401, 412 (1995) (“After all, writing
papers makes no money and consumes time.”).
116 To be sure, inventors have plenty of incentives to disclose as little as possible. See Wagner,
supra note 2, at 2150-51 (discussing factors that lead applicants to “defer clarity” on their disclosures);
see also H. JACKSON KNIGHT, PATENT STRATEGY FOR RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH
MANAGERS 88-89 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining how much information an inventor should disclose).
117 See LEONARD-BARTON, supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also FIRESTEIN, supra
note 93, at 42 (“[K]nowing that something doesn’t work can be as valuable as knowing that it does.”).
As the great science philosopher Karl Popper once wrote:
Refutations have often been regarded as establishing the failure of a scientist, or at least of his
theory. It should be stressed that this is an inductivist error. Every refutation should be regarded
as a great success . . . . Even if a new theory . . . should meet an early death, it should not be
forgotten; rather its beauty should be remembered, and history should record our gratitude to it.

KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
243 (2002).
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innovators can learn a lot from failure.118 Since scientific publications and
patent documents are both major sources of technical information,119
nondisclosure frustrates the shared goal of science and patent law of
promoting technological progress by disseminating knowledge.120
There is no doubt that nondisclosure is costly—both in time and money—when
other researchers waste resources on experiments that have failed previously.121
One commentator provides an excellent example of how this might happen:
[Y]ou might think that Compound X will prevent Cancer Z from metastasizing.
But if your experiments show that Compound X does not prevent Cancer Z from
metastasizing, you have a negative result . . . . If other researchers are also really
interested in Compound X, they would probably want to know that your
experiments showed Compound X was ineffective. That way they could make an
informed decision about how (or whether) to proceed with their own Compound
X experiments. But they probably won’t find out about your Compound X
experiments, because most negative results never get published.122

This scenario yields a publication that tells an incomplete story of a
research project in which the scientifically obvious—but undisclosed—path
failed and a not-so-obvious path worked. Other scientists may look at the
work and ask why the original researchers did not follow the obvious path and
then proceed to redo the failures.123 Thus, concealing failure sets up other
researchers to do a wasted redundancy.124
118

Cf. STEFAN H. THOMKE, EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INNOVATION 23 (2003) (“Innovators learn from
failure . . . . [K]nowledge of either failure or success itself can be stockpiled, providing a resource
that, if not applicable to one set of experiments, can be used for subsequent inquiries.”); William J.
Broad, Taking Lessons From What Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at D1 (“Disaster, in short,
can become a spur to innovation.”).
119 Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 51, at 624 (explaining that like technical journals,
patents show the state of technology, reveal what has already been done, and provide technical
information that others can avoid repeating). THOMAS T. GORDON & ARTHUR S. COOKFAIR,
PATENT FUNDAMENTALS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 51 (2d ed. 2000).
120 See KELLY MORE, DISRUPTING SCIENCE 2 n.5 (2008) (“Science is considered to be simultaneously
a body of knowledge . . . and the means by which knowledge is acquired and disseminated.”); see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (stating that “the ultimate goal of the patent
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure”).
121 There are several well-publicized examples. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, New Journals Bet
“Negative Results” Save Time, Money, WALL STREET J., Sept. 15, 2006, at B1 (describing how
publication bias suppressing negative results regarding an alleged link between oral contraceptives
and cervical cancer led to erroneous conclusions and wasted time and money). Sometimes
withholding negative results is deliberately done to make competitors squander their resources.
122 Matt Shipman, The Challenge of Negative Results, SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN
(May 28, 2013), http://www.scilogs.com/communication_breakdown/negative-results/ [https://perma.cc/
J6CZ-D4YK].
123 FETZER, supra note 95, at 17-18.
124 Id.
OF
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A related concern is that withholding negative results can overrepresent
the rate of success—or mask problems—in a particular technical field.125 The
incomplete information can improperly skew debates,126 lead to an imprudent
allocation of resources,127 or even jeopardize public welfare.128
Perhaps the biggest drawback is that nondisclosure causes a drag on
scientific progress.129 Admitting and reporting negative results keeps scientists
honest; and staying honest “is the whole point of science.”130 But aside from
that, negative results “serve to drive the scientific method forward by showing
the path not to follow.”131 Other scientists could possibly fix the error or use
the failed experiment as a building block for other scientific endeavors.132 But

125 Emma Granqvist, Looking at Research from a New Angle, ELSEVIER CONNECT (May 11, 2015),
https://www.elsevier.com/editors-update/story/publishing-ethics/looking-at-research-from-a-newangle [https://perma.cc/7LM6-MB2K] (“Ignoring the vast information source that is negative results
is troublesome . . . . it skews the scientific literature by only including chosen pieces of information.”).
126 See, e.g., Knight, supra note 94, at 554 (noting how the nonpublication of negative results
pertaining to genetically modified crops has skewed the debate; suggesting that there are no adverse
health effects or environmental consequences).
127 For example, a funding agency might decide to approve a research proposal that it otherwise
would deny if the agency knew the full story of the research project. BERNARD LO, ETHICAL ISSUES IN
CLINICAL RESEARCH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 113 (2010) (explaining how withholding negative results
wastes scarce resources because it can direct funding away from more meritorious research projects).
128 To illustrate, a pharmaceutical company conducting clinical trials for a new drug
deliberately suppressed negative results to make the drug appear safer and more effective than it
really was. See David Egilman & Emily Ardolino, The Pharmaceutical Industry, Disease Industry: A
Prescription for Illness and Death, in THE BOTTOM LINE OR PUBLIC HEALTH: TACTICS
CORPORATIONS USE TO INFLUENCE HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY, AND WHAT WE CAN DO
TO COUNTER THEM 193, 193-201 (William H. Wiist ed., 2010) (explaining how Merck’s suppression
of Vioxx’s negative cardiovascular side effects led to adverse events in patients including bleeding,
heart attacks, and death); FIRESTEIN, supra note 93, at 148-49 (discussing Vioxx and Merck’s
decision to strategically withhold negative results to increase the likelihood of FDA approval).
129 Thomas Goetz, Freeing the Dark Data of Failed Science Experiments, WIRED MAGAZINE (Sept. 26,
2007), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/15-10/st_essay [https://perma.cc/7652-EAPD];
see also Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent
Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 259 (2008) (arguing that the nondisclosure of negative results
in drug studies “hinders the advancement of medical knowledge”).
130 FIRESTEIN, supra note 93, at 149 (citing RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, “SURELY YOU’RE JOKING,
MR. FEYNMAN!”: ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 341) (1985) (“The idea is to try to
give all the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the
information that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.”).
131 Alcantara et al., supra note 98, at 1 (emphasis added).
132 As one commentator has explained, “The best failures produce[] an abundance of data, and,
at the very least, a failed experiment eliminate[s] whatever approach to a problem was under
consideration and thereby ma[kes] way for some alternative.” ALAN AXELROD, EDISON ON
INNOVATION 40-41 (2008); cf. FIRESTEIN, supra note 93, at 33 (“Failures . . . don’t just lead to a
discovery by providing a correction . . . they lead to a fundamental change in the way we think about
future experiments as well . . .”). See also Fanelli, supra note 103, at 1 (“[A]ll [experimental] results
are equally relevant to science”); ANDREW HARGADON, HOW BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN 55
(2003) (describing the role of failed experiments in innovation).
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nondisclosure condemns this valuable technical information to the sea of
squandered knowledge.133
Nondisclosure also creates problems for the patent system. Concealment of
failure creates an information deficit in the public storehouse of technical
knowledge.134 This is important because determining whether an invention satisfies
the substantive standards of patentability depends on what the inventor discloses
and its relation to extant knowledge and potential contribution to the storehouse.135
When technical information is concealed, it can cause all sorts of problems—
including misgauging patentability136 and hindering innovation.137 It is also true
that much technical information not disclosed through the patent system will never
enter the public storehouse of knowledge and will likely be lost.138
III. CAN AN INVENTOR CONCEAL FAILURE?
Although concealment of failure continues to be the norm in the peerreviewed technical literature,139 the aforementioned costs have sparked
discussions and bit of movement in the academy toward full disclosure.140 The
133 See P. Bryan Heidorn, Shedding Light on the Dark Data in the Long Tail of Science, 57 LIB.
TRENDS 280, 284-87 (2008) (describing the benefits of bringing “dark data” to light); Alcantara et
al., supra note 98, at 1 (“There is a huge untapped resource of experimental data locked up in
laboratory notebooks that could be of great service to the scientific community.”).
134 See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (discussing the “storehouse” of knowledge).
135 A patent can only be awarded for technical advances which add to or enrich the storehouse.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 684, 688 (1966) (“Innovation, advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of useful Arts.’”); Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc.
v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the purpose
of the enablement requirement is to ensure enrichment of public knowledge).
136 See Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, supra note 15, at 991 (“Clearly an examiner must have all
of the relevant technical information in hand in order to accurately gauge patentability.”).
137 See supra notes 118 and 132 and accompanying text.
138 Most information disclosed in a patent document does not appear in another medium. See
Esteban Burrone & Guriqbal Singh Jaiya, Intellectual Property (IP) Rights and Innovation in Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises 3 (unpublished manuscript) http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
sme/en/documents/pdf/iprs_innovation.pdf [https:/perma.cc/UWQ6-MXUX] (“It has been estimated
that patent documents contain 70% of the world’s accumulated technical knowledge and that most
of the information contained in patent documents is either never published elsewhere or is first
disclosed through the publication of the patent application.”); Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note
51, at 666 (discussing situations in which “the patent system is the sole medium of disclosure”).
139 FETZER, supra note 95, at 17-18.
140 For instance, a growing number of prestigious medical journals like the New England Journal of
Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association refuse to publish research involving clinical
trials unless all of the data is disclosed beforehand in a public registry. See Catherine De Angelis et al.,
Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250 (2004) (presenting the new publication policy of the International Committee
of Medical Journal Editors member journals). Also, some publishers have created journals whose sole
purpose is to disclose negative results, including The All Results Journals, http://arjournals.com/; Journal of
Negative Results, http://www.jnr-eeb.org/index.php/jnr; Journal of Pharmaceutical Negative Results,
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story is a bit more complicated for patent law. Below I explain why an
applicant must act if inoperable subject matter is claimed in a patent.
A. The Patent Applicant’s Duty of Disclosure
Patent applicants know more about their invention than the Patent Office,
including information that might compromise patentability.141 And since the
Patent Office has no way to test or verify what is disclosed, it must rely on
information presented by the applicant.142 In the case of experimental failure,
the applicant has a great incentive not to disclose such information because
the Patent Office has no other way to find out about it.143 The confluence of
these factors gives rise to an information asymmetry between the Patent
Office and the applicant.144 As a result, the Patent Office and the courts
impose a duty of candor and good faith (also known as the duty of
disclosure)145 upon applicants to combat the information asymmetry.
1. Basic Principles
The duty of disclosure is inextricably intertwined with the public’s
interest in granting patents. The essence of the U.S. patent system is a quid
pro quo between the patentee and the public.146 The basic idea is that in order
to promote the full disclosure of information about the invention to the
public, the patentee must receive something in return.147 What the patentee

http://www.pnrjournal.com/; Journal of Negative Results in Biomedicine, http://jnrbm.biomedcentral.com/;
and New Negatives in Plant Science, http://www.journals.elsevier.com/new-negatives-in-plant-science.
141 Cf. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 734 (2004) (arguing that applicants can do much to improve
the information deficit because they “know better than [the Patent Office or] anyone else precisely
what it is they have developed or invented.”).
142 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1970); FTC
REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 9 (“Yet the PTO lacks testing facilities, and assertions that cannot be
overcome by documentary evidence promptly identifiable by the examiner often must be accepted.”).
143 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 805, 818 (2011)
[hereinafter Holbrook, Presumptions] (exploring the incentives for applicants to behave strategically and
withhold certain information from the examiner, particularly in the absence of an adversarial check).
144 For a deeper discussion of the information asymmetry, see Seymore, Patent Asymmetries,
supra note 15, at 991-96.
145 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(describing the duty of candor and good faith).
146 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (discussing the bestowal of
exclusivity that accompanies the grant of a patent); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480-81 (1974) (explaining the wisdom of bestowing limited monopoly rights in the patent system to
encourage innovation).
147 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480-81.
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gets is the limited period of exclusivity conferred by the patent grant.148 The
public gets detailed knowledge about the invention as soon as the patent
document publishes149 and possession of it at the end of the patent term.150
But the putative public benefit of this paradigm rests on the assumption
that the applicant was honest and candid with the Patent Office.151 Since the
Patent Office lacks its own testing facilities and unlimited time to ascertain
the facts necessary to evaluate the patentability of each application, it must
rely on applicants to disclose most of the facts upon which its decisions are
based. According the C.C.P.A., this creates a “relationship of trust” between
the Patent Office and the applicant.152 Thus, the “highest standards of honesty
and candor” on the part of applicants in presenting facts to the Patent Office
are not only necessary but “essential” elements in a working patent system.153
Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that in working with
applicants during patent prosecution, the Patent Office “must rely on their
integrity and deal with them in a spirit of trust and confidence.”154 This,
according to the Court, “requires the highest degree of candor and good
faith.”155 Imposing a duty of candor is appropriate because
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by
the Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of
promoting the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” At the same time, a patent
is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access
to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences
of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable
conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.156

148 Id. at 480 (“In return for the right of exclusion—this ‘reward for inventions’—the patent
laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure.” (citation omitted)).
149 See id. at 481 (explaining that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly
available it adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate ideas and promote
technological development).
150 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to put the public in
complete possession of the invention . . . so that interference with it may be avoided while the patent
continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent expires.”).
151 Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 37, 37 (1993) (discussing the conflict patent attorneys face between the duty of candor to the PTO
and a duty to zealously work for their clients and the negative incentives that system can cause).
152 Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
153 Id. at 794; cf. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining
that applicants must prosecute patent applications “with candor, good faith, and honesty.”).
154 Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949).
155 Id.
156 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)
(discussing the importance of the patent system to the public).
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Thus, the duty not only helps ensure that the Patent Office evaluates
patentability based on all of the relevant information known to the applicant—it
also helps ensure that the public gets its end of the patent bargain.
The Patent Office imposes the duty of disclosure on every individual
substantively involved in patent prosecution—including the inventor, the
attorney or agent that prepares the patent application, and the assignee.157
These individuals must “disclose to the [Patent] Office all information known
to that individual to be material to patentability.”158 Importantly for present
purposes, materiality “embraces any information” relevant to patentability,159
including that pertaining to enablement.160 Finally, the duty exists with
respect to each claim in a patent application until a patent issues or the
application is abandoned.161
2. Breach and Inequitable Conduct
The duty of disclosure is enforced primarily through the judge-made
doctrine of inequitable conduct.162 A finding of inequitable conduct renders
a patent unenforceable163 if intentional misconduct (such as a deliberate
misrepresentation or omission of material information from the Patent
Office) led the patentee to obtain an unwarranted patent claim.164 The Patent
Office rarely learns about potential misconduct during prosecution; it
typically comes to light in patent litigation.165 Thus, inequitable conduct is
usually asserted as an equitable defense to patent infringement.166
157
158
159
160
161
162

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2015) (setting the requirements for the duty of disclosure).
Id. (emphasis added).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id.; MPEP, supra note 57, § 2001.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a); MPEP, supra note 57, § 2001.04.
The doctrine evolved from several Supreme Court cases applying the equitable unclean
hands doctrine as a defense to patent infringement. See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator
Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 249-50
(1944), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); see also
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (defining the
doctrine of inequitable conduct and tracking its progress and development).
163 Unlike invalidity which may affect a single claim, “it is . . . settled law that inequitable
conduct with respect to one claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.” Baxter Int’l, Inc. v.
McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Moreover, “the taint of a finding
of inequitable conduct can spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents
and applications if they are sufficiently related.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649
F.3d 1276, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted).
164 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
165 See Gary M. Hoffman & Michael C. Greenbaum, The Duty of Disclosure Requirement, 16
AIPLA Q.J. 124, 145 (1988) (discussing a process of finding fraud that relies on the examiners and
leads to inequities in reporting).
166 Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also 6A
CHISUM, supra note 69, § 19.03.
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The Federal Circuit recently reconsidered the contours and standards
governing the inequitable conduct defense in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co.167 The defense has two prongs—materiality and intent.168
Regarding materiality, the general rule is that the misrepresented or omitted
information must be “but-for material”—meaning that the challenger must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the [Patent Office] would
not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed” information.169
Regarding intent, the challenger must prove by clear and convincing evidence
a specific intent to deceive the Patent Office.170 In the case of nondisclosure,
this requires proof that “the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold”
known material information.171 This means that the applicant “knew of the
[information], knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to
withhold it.”172 If the challenger proves both elements, then the court “must
weigh the equities to determine whether the applicant’s conduct before the
[Patent Office] warrants rendering the entire patent unenforceable.”173
3. Submitting Misleading Technical Information
Although the Patent Office does not explicitly address failure in its
materials on the duty of disclosure, it provides guidance on filing patent
applications with technical inaccuracies. In a section entitled “Aids to
Compliance with Duty of Disclosure,”174 the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure175 cautions applicants that “[c]are should be taken to see that
inaccurate statements or inaccurate experiments are not introduced into the
[patent document], either inadvertently or intentionally.”176
167
168
169

649 F.3d at 1276.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291; accord Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The key exception is in cases of “affirmative acts of egregious misconduct” such as when the patentee
filed “an unmistakably false affidavit.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
170 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
171 Id.
172 Id.; accord 1st Media, LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(affirming the Therasense three-part test for deceptive intent). Given the difficulty in obtaining direct
evidence of deceptive intent, the intent to deceive can be inferred from indirect and circumstantial
evidence if it is “the single most reasonable inference.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (citation omitted).
173 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287.
174 MPEP, supra note 57, § 2004.
175 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) provides guidance to patent examiners and
is entitled to judicial notice as the Patent Office’s official interpretation of statutes and regulations.
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also supra note 57. The MPEP
“is also made available to patent applicants and their lawyers as well as to the general public . . . [and]
is used frequently by patent lawyers and agents in advising applicants and in preparing their various
papers for filing in the Patent Office.” In re Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
176 MPEP, supra note 57, § 2004.
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Concealing failure would qualify as an intentional disclosure of an
inaccurate statement or experiment. If a patent applicant files a patent
application with a prophetic disclosure and then learns (through post-filing
experimentation) that some of the subject matter does not work as described,
the written description would be inaccurate and the claims would cover
inoperative embodiments. This, of course, raises an enablement issue.177 If the
applicant does nothing, the key question is whether the concealment
constitutes inequitable conduct.
Deliberately concealing experimental failure could be viewed as an
attempt to mislead the Patent Office into granting the patent. This could
easily meet the Therasense standard for inequitable conduct.178 To illustrate, I
return to the hypothetical introduced earlier.179 Recall that the inventor
disclosed and claimed four compounds W, X, Y, and Z that were purportedly
effective for treating arthritis. Recall that W had been made and showed
promising results but the others had been disclosed prophetically. Post-filing
experimentation revealed that X works as described but Y and Z do not.
Nondisclosed information is but-for material if the Patent Office “would not
have allowed a claim had it been aware of it.”180 This prong is satisfied here
because an examiner probably would have rejected the claim because Y and Z
are nonenabled.181 For intent, the question is whether the applicant “knew of
the [information], knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision
to withhold it.”182 This prong could be satisfied if the applicant knew that the
experimental failure would create an enablement problem and decided to
deliberately conceal this information from the Patent Office.
The Federal Circuit has had occasion to consider alleged inequitable
conduct where the patentee withheld information material to enablement. In
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,183 a patent was held
unenforceable because the patentee intentionally failed to disclose that some
of the claimed subject matter did not work.184 To simplify the facts, the
inventors had drafted a scientific article which disclosed a synthetic process
177
178
179
180

See supra Part I.C.
See supra notes 167–173 and accompanying text.
See INTRODUCTION, supra.
Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
181 This admittedly is a close question. Compare Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that a claim is not necessarily invalid for
nonenablement if some of the claimed embodiments are inoperative) with In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730,
735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that a claim might be invalid for nonenablement if it covers a
significant number of inoperative embodiments).
182 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
183 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
184 Id. at 1239-40.
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for making the cancer drug Taxol but noted that two chemical reactants, when
used in the process, did not work.185 The inventors sent the draft to their
French patent agent, who prepared a French patent application that disclosed
and claimed the two chemicals as permissible reactants in the process.186 The
French application was filed, the scientific article published, and a
counterpart U.S. application filed.187 The scientific article was not disclosed
to the examiner during prosecution.188 The U.S. application ultimately issued
as a patent.189 Because the patentee wanted more claim coverage, it filed a
reissue application which was assigned to the same examiner.190 The attorney
handling the reissue disclosed the scientific article late in the prosecution,
which the examiner considered.191 The patent eventually reissued.192
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
inequitable conduct had occurred.193 The scientific article was material because
it disclosed information about enablement—the article taught that two
chemical reactants in the claimed process would not work.194 And no testimony
from the inventors or expert witnesses indicated that the failures reported in
the article were limited to a single experiment or that a PHOSITA could
figure out how to make the claimed process work with the two reactants at
issue without undue experimentation.195 Intent was satisfied because the
patent agent intentionally withheld the scientific article in an attempt to
mislead the Patent Office during the original prosecution. The court rejected
the argument that intent was lacking because the inventors believed that the
application was sufficiently enabling; the relevant inquiry was the applicant’s
intent with respect to nondisclosure of relevant information.196 That the
185
186
187

Id. at 1230.
See id. at 1230-31.
Id. Applicants who first file abroad can obtain the benefit of the foreign filing date for the
corresponding U.S. application if certain conditions are met. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) (2012).
188 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 326 F.3d at 1231.
189 Id.
190 Under certain circumstances, after a patent issues, the patentee can withdraw the issued
patent and subject it to further prosecution through a reissue process if the patent is deemed
defective. 35 U.S.C. § 251. One basis for reissue can be that the patentee “claim[ed] more or less
than he had a right to claim in the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 251(a). In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the patentee
filed the reissue patent application to obtain coverage for previously disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter. 326 F.3d at 1232.
191 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 326 F.3d at 1233.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1229.
194 In this pre-Therasense case the court applied the “reasonable examiner” materiality standard.
Id. at 1234. Under that standard, materiality “embraces any information that a reasonable examiner
would be substantially likely to consider important in deciding whether to allow an application to
issue as a patent.” GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
195 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 326 F.3d at 1235.
196 Id. at 1241.
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scientific article was subsequently disclosed in the reissue prosecution did not
cure the inequitable conduct because it should have been disclosed sooner.197
Very important for present purposes, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that the patent agent intentionally drafted the claims
more broadly than warranted by the scientific evidence.198 The patent agent
withheld the scientific article because disclosing information that two of the
claimed reactants did not work would have raised an enablement issue and
led the examiner to insist on narrower claims. In sum, the applicant’s failure
to disclose information relevant to enablement led the Patent Office to grant
a patent of unwarranted scope.199
B. The “Inoperative Embodiments” Doctrine
Patent applicants take the duty of disclosure seriously given the potential
consequences for noncompliance.200 While applicants are well-advised to
disclose in the case of doubt,201 no action is required if the information is not
material to patentability. In the case of inventive failure, if the examiner would
have allowed the claim notwithstanding knowledge that the claim encompasses
nonenabled subject matter, then silence will not breach the duty of disclosure.
Some would argue that the “inoperative embodiments” doctrine, discussed
below, permits concealment without committing inequitable conduct.
1. Contours
Since all would agree that a valid patent claim should not cover subject
matter that does not work,202 one may wonder why such claims proliferate.

197 Id. at 1237. Reissue cannot be used to cure inequitable conduct that occurred during the original
prosecution. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1341 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Indeed, the (reissue) patent might be valid but still rendered unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
See PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
198 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 326 F.3d at 1239.
199 Id. at 1235.
200 Aside from rendering the patent or patent family unenforceable, a finding of inequitable
conduct can “spawn antitrust and unfair competition claims,” “lead[] to an award of attorney’s fees,”
and “prove the crime or fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). It may also “paint the patentee as a
bad actor” and create “ruinous consequences for the reputation of [the] patent attorney.” Id. at 1288.
201 MPEP, supra note 57, § 2004.10 (“When in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit
information. Even though the attorney, agent, or applicant doesn’t consider it necessarily material,
someone else may see it differently . . . .”); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Close cases should be resolved by disclosure, not
unilaterally by the applicant.”).
202 Long ago there was a rule applied by some courts that “a claim which covers an inoperative
form along with operative forms [of the invention] is void.” Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of
U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 377, 398 (1938).
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Recall that enablement is a standard which affords the decisionmaker a fair
amount of discretion. Thus, the decisionmaker can set the threshold for
enablement sufficiently high to render any claim covering nonenabled subject
matter invalid. Indeed, there are plenty of old cases where the court has struck
down a broad claim that covered inoperable embodiments within its scope.203
And recently the Federal Circuit has been touting a “full scope” enablement
requirement,204 meaning that “[c]laims are not enabled when, at the effective
filing date of the patent, [a PHOSITA] could not practice their full scope
without undue experimentation.”205 In simple terms, this means that the
patent’s written description “must enable every potential embodiment of the
invention.”206 So it might seem that the rise of full scope enablement would
eventually solve the failure problem.207
But the story is not so simple. There is an enablement subdoctrine—the
inoperative embodiments doctrine208—which renders a broad claim not
necessarily invalid as long as some (perhaps most) of the subject matter works
as described.209 The analysis will depend on the circumstances of each case—
including the nature of the subject matter,210 the PHOSITA’s level of skill,211
and the number of inoperative embodiments.212
203 See, e.g., Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895); see also Corona Cord Tire Co.
v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 388 (1928).
204 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
205 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)
(citing MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
206 Sherkow, supra note 95, at 875.
207 See Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 278, 284-89 (2008) (describing the emergence of “full scope” enablement as a “lever to
invalidate patents”); cf. James Farrand et al., “Reform” Arrives in Patent Enforcement: The Big Picture,
51 IDEA 357, 415-17 (2011) (describing the full scope enablement doctrine and noting that it “can
invalidate many existing broad patent claims, particularly if it continues to be applied as broadly as
it is being stated.”).
208 The doctrine has existed for quite some time. See RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS
§§ 216-226 (1949); H. Einhorn, The Enforceability of Patent Claims Encompassing Some Inoperative
Species, 45 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 716, 716-19 (1963); Herbert H. Goodman, The Invalidation of Generic
Claims by Inclusion of a Small Number of Inoperative Species, 40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 745, 748-50 (1958).
Professor Jeffrey Leftsin named it the “inoperative embodiments doctrine” in Jeffrey A. Leftsin, The
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1178 (2008).
209 See In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(noting that the mere inclusion of inoperative embodiments in a claim will not defeat patentability).
210 Until recently, the amount of enablement required to enable a broad claim turned on
whether the claimed subject matter was from a “predictable” or “unpredictable” field. See discussion
supra notes 49–55 and infra notes 243–247 and accompanying text.
211 See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d at 735 (upholding a broad claim that read on a large number
of inoperative embodiments because a PHOSITA could figure out with minimal effort which of the
unmade embodiments could work as intended).
212 See, e.g., Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (determining that the claim
was invalid because most of the claimed embodiments were inoperable); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]f the number of inoperative
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The inoperable embodiments doctrine is quite patentee-friendly.213 The
courts make clear that “[i]t is not a function of the claims to specifically
exclude . . . possible inoperative substances.”214 If the applicant had to
demonstrate that every claimed embodiment works, according to the courts,
“the research to do this would evidently be endless.”215 So the traditional
evidentiary rules apply; most notably, a presumption in both the Patent
Office and the courts that the full scope of a claim is enabled.216 The burden
rests with the party challenging enablement to prove unpatentability or
invalidity, respectively.217
Yet despite the evidentiary rules, the older cases limited the applicability
of the doctrine in patent prosecution. In In re Cook,218 the C.C.P.A. had to
consider the patentability of a broad claim which covered inoperative subject
matter.219 Writing for the court, Judge Giles Rich (the co-drafter of the 1952
Patent Act and regarded by many as “the founding father of modern patent
law”220) explained that when the examiner makes a prima facie case of
inoperability, “it becomes incumbent upon the applicant either to reasonably
limit his claims to the approximate area where operativeness has not been
challenged or to rebut the examiner’s challenge either by the submission of
representative evidence . . . or by persuasive arguments based on known laws

[embodiments] becomes significant, and in effect forces [a PHOSITA] to experiment unduly in
order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid.”); see also Durel Corp.
v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining that if the accused
infringer shows that a “significant percentage” of embodiments encompassed by the claims are
inoperable, that might be sufficient to prove invalidity).
213 See ELLIS, supra note 208, § 217 (“One thing seems clear and that is that usually 100%
operativeness is not required.”).
214 In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858-59 (C.C.P.A. 1974), quoted in Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1576.
215 In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1964); see also ELLIS, supra note 208, § 214
(recognizing that in theory the only way that a chemist can determine if all species within a claimed
genus will work as described is by testing “at least a majority of the members of that genus”).
216 See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining the presumption and
placing the burden on the examiner to prove nonenablement by a preponderance of the evidence);
ELLIS, supra note 208, § 227 (“[U]nless the examiner has good reason for doubting the applicant’s
statements, he should accept them at face value.”); cf. In re Ellis, 37 App. D.C. 203, 209 (D.C. Cir.)
(1911) (reaffirming the rule that doubts as to operability of all of the claimed subject matter in a
claimed genus should be resolved in the applicant’s favor). But see In re Harwood, 390 F.2d 985,
989-90 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (affirming a § 112 rejection for an application claiming a genus of
compounds as useful as a pesticide because the Patent Office successfully proved that the claims
were broader than the supporting disclosure which suggested that only certain species would work).
217 See supra note 216; see also PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp., 75 F.3d 1558,
1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a patented invention was enabled because the challenger did not
prove that undue experimentation would be required to practice the undescribed embodiments).
218 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
219 Id. at 731-32.
220 KIEFF, supra note 22, at 24. Judge Rich joined the C.C.P.A. in 1956 and later served on the
Federal Circuit until his death in 1999 at age 95. Id.
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of physics and chemistry.”221 Importantly, he felt that in patent prosecution,
the applicant still has a chance to amend the claims.222 Of course, this is not
the case in litigation. In that context Judge Rich thought that the doctrine
can be justified because equitable considerations might be present;223 namely,
the court’s reluctance to permit an infringer to raise an invalidity defense
merely because one or more claimed embodiments do not work.224
Nonetheless, the inoperative embodiments doctrine vitiates full scope
enablement. Again, full scope enablement means that a PHOSITA should be
able to read the patent’s written description of the invention and—combined
with the PHOSITA’s own knowledge and skill—make and use everything that
is claimed. So if the patent covers a billion chemical compounds which
purportedly have a specific pharmacological activity, the PHOSITA should
be enabled to make and use each of them.225
2. Theoretical Rationale
Although the doctrine’s existence essentially guarantees the issuance of
patents that claim failure, it finds considerable support in patent law. Robert
Merges and Richard Nelson argue that requiring a tighter connection
between the disclosure and the claims would lead to narrow patents of little
value because an imitator could find minor variations over the embodiments
specifically exemplified or actually reduced to practice.226
To better understand this reasoning, consider the following scenario,
which is pretty typical in unpredictable fields:227

221
222

In re Cook, 439 F.2d at 734-35 n.4 (citation omitted).
Id. at 734 n.3; cf. ELLIS, supra note 208, § 218 (explaining that when claims are obviously
too broad, “the Patent Office should require their limitation, where possible, so that the obviously
inoperative members of the class are excluded.”).
223 Cook, 439 F.2d at 734 n.4. (citing Einhorn, supra note 208; Goodman, supra note 208).
224 See ELLIS, supra note 208, § 216 (“If most of the members of the class are operative and a
later comer wishes to use one of such members, he should not be permitted to excuse his
infringement of a broad claim to the class by a diligent search for some member or members which
will not work.”).
225 This normative position aligns with that of the author of an old patent treatise:
A chemist tests a substance X and finds it useful for his purpose. He then makes a guess that
all other substances of the same chemical class will act in the same way. If his guess is wrong,
his broad claim to the entire class is invalid . . . . All that the inventor did was to discover
that species X would work. His broad claim to the entire genus was nothing more than a
pregnant surmise or a promising hypothesis. If he guesses right, the patent will be valid.

Id. § 221 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
226 Merges & Nelson, supra note 74, at 845; see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc.,
429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing that narrow patent rights become worthless as new
modes of practicing the invention develop).
227 See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unpredictable arts.
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A discovery is made that a chemical has certain properties and utility . . . . The
inventor, a skilled chemist, predicts that all or most of the other members of the
class have the same properties and utility. Further experimentation . . . reveals
that other representative chemicals within the class do have these properties and
utility. On the basis of the foregoing, the inventor believes that all members of
the class should be operative. As a careful chemist, he admits the possibility that
some members may exhibit anomalous behavior. The only method of
determining whether a given chemical is operative is to test it. The class usually
includes thousands of known and theoretical compounds. The cost of testing
them all would be prohibitive.
To claim the invention broadly, it is necessary to claim the entire class. To claim
less than the entire class allows the patent to be avoided . . . .228

Thus, the doctrine seemingly adds value to patent claims.229 Infringers
cannot point to the inoperability of one (or more) species as a basis for
invalidating a broad claim.230
Another rationale for the inoperable embodiments doctrine is that a more
stringent enablement requirement would contravene § 112, particularly in the
unpredictable arts. The C.C.P.A. explained this rationale in In re Angstadt.231 The
applicant claimed a genus of thousands of compounds of similar chemical
structure that were useful as catalysts for forming hydroperoxides.232 The written
description disclosed that forty experiments had been carried out and revealed
that some of the claimed compounds failed to work as described—meaning that
they were inoperable as catalysts.233 And since the applicant did not specify how
to figure out which compounds were (in)operable, the Patent Office rejected the

228
229

Goodman, supra note 208, at 745 (emphasis added).
It is true that claims are of little value unless they can ensnare or deter a potential infringer.
Patentees achieve this goal by obtaining broad claims which cover “all expected and unanticipated
[variants] that competitors and others may later develop and all intentional and unintentional copies
of the claimed invention which embody the inventor’s concept.” ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON
MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 10:1.1[B] (5th ed. 2004). Thus, the claims must cover
not only competing products envisioned at the time of filing, but also competing products that the
patentee could barely imagine which employ the concept of the invention. See id.; George F.
Wheeler, Creative Claim Drafting: Claim Drafting Strategies, Specification Preparation, and Prosecution
Tactics, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 38-40 (2003) (“If a patentee wants the best
available protection, the retained patent prosecutor must do the work of discovering the available
protection in view of the hprior art and obtaining the broadest possible claims to literally cover the
invention and reasonably foreseeable variants.”).
230 Einhorn, supra note 208, at 718.
231 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
232 Id. at 500.
233 Id.
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claims for nonenablement because a PHOSITA would have to engage in undue
experimentation to do so.234 On appeal, the C.C.P.A. reversed:
Appellants have apparently not disclosed every catalyst which will work; they
have apparently not disclosed every catalyst which will not work. The
question, then, is whether in an unpredictable art, section 112 requires
disclosure of a test with every species covered by a claim. To require such a
complete disclosure would apparently necessitate a patent application or
applications with “thousands” of examples or the disclosure of “thousands”
of catalysts along with information as to whether each exhibits catalytic
behavior . . . . More importantly, such a requirement would force an inventor
seeking adequate patent protection to carry out a prohibitive number of
actual experiments. This would tend to discourage inventors from filing
patent applications in an unpredictable area since the patent claims would
have to be limited to those embodiments which are expressly disclosed.235

Thus, according to this view, the doctrine promotes early disclosure,236
gives the patentee an edge over competitors,237 and prevents patent
documents from becoming overly thick.238
Finally, ratcheting up the enablement threshold to exclude inoperable
embodiments would render an incalculable number of patents technically
invalid for nonenablement—particularly in the unpredictable fields.239 Such
234
235
236

Id. at 501.
Id. at 502-03.
As stated by one court:
The invention . . . was a generic invention . . . . Rohm and Haas was not required to
limit its 1958 application to the precise crops where selectivity had at that time been
demonstrated. Such a requirement would discourage an inventor from disclosing and
teaching his discovery for the public’s benefit until all screening had been completed,
in contravention to the guiding principles underlying § 112.

Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 739, 801-02 (S.D. Tex. 1983), rev’d on
other grounds, 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
237 See Edlyn S. Simmons, Prior Art Searching in the Preparation of Pharmaceutical Patent
Applications, 3 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 52, 52 (1998) (explaining the importance of drafting broad
generic claims which include hypothetical compounds in order to prevent competitors from
developing them).
238 See In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“Not every last detail is to be described,
else patent specifications would turn into production specifications, which they were never intended
to be. United States specifications have often been criticized as too cluttered with details to give an
easy understanding of what the invention really is.”). Under current Patent Office practice,
applicants must pay additional filing fees for applications which exceed a threshold page count. See
35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1)(G) (2012).
239 Bernard Chao argues that a heightened enablement standard would be inequitable: “There
is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls within a claim. In many cases, that embodiment will
not be enabled. But a claim should not be invalidated simply because the inventor did not foresee
every embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope.” Bernard Chao, The Infringement
Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1378 (2014).
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action could immediately place the patent portfolios of numerous companies
at risk and open the door for more enablement challenges in patent
litigation.240 But there is another side to the story. Abandoning the doctrine
and insisting on full scope enablement would lead to better claim drafting,
narrower claims, and—importantly for present purposes—fewer issued
patents that claim failure.241
3. Robustness
As discussed above, it is hard to reconcile the inoperative embodiments
doctrine with full scope enablement. A claim is either enabled across its full
scope or it is not. Given the Federal Circuit’s move toward full scope
enablement, this raises the question about the continued viability of the
inoperative embodiments doctrine.
There are two reasons why the inoperative embodiments doctrine is
arguably less robust than before. First, the court has eviscerated the single
embodiment doctrine—a related doctrine which also preserved the validity of a
dubiously enabled claim.242 Until recently, there was a dichotomy in
enablement jurisprudence:243 the courts applied separate enablement
standards for inventions in the predictable and unpredictable arts.244 In the
predictable arts, which includes electrical and mechanical devices, a specific
and detailed teaching was not required because the inventions are rooted in
well-defined, predictable factors.245 This meant that an applicant rarely
needed to show more than a single embodiment to enable a broad claim.246
240 A similar concern arose in the wake of several biotech-related Supreme Court decisions
that narrowed the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See, e.g., Mayo
Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 (2012) (holding that a method for
determining the amount of a drug for treating a patient was unpatentable under § 101 for
encompassing a law of nature); see also, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (holding that isolated DNA fragments are unpatentable products of
nature). But such fears have not been realized. See, e.g., Joseph F. Aceto, Patent Portfolios After
Myriad, How to Fit in Those New Genes?, 4 AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y MED. CHEMISTRY LETTERS
681, 682 (2013) (explaining why “the sky is not falling”).
241 And as discussed infra Part IV, such a move could open the door for new inventors who would
no longer have to work in the shadow of (invalid) broad claims. See also discussion infra Section III.A.
242 For a general discussion of the doctrine, see Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 61,
at 136-37; Seymore, Enablement Pendulum, supra note 207, at 280-84.
243 For a deeper discussion of the predictable–unpredictable dichotomy, see Seymore, Heightened
Enablement, supra note 61, at 136-39; Seymore, Enablement Pendulum, supra note 207, at 282-84.
244 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unpredictable arts.
245 See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of
disclosure for an invention involving predictable mechanical or electrical elements is less than that
required for the unpredictable arts).
246 The patentee is “generally allowed [broad] claims, when the art permits, which cover more
than the specific embodiment shown.” In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944); id. at 527 (“In
mechanical cases . . . broad claims may be supported by a single form of the apparatus disclosed in an
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The broad claim survived even if it encompassed inadequately disclosed
subject matter because applicants in predictable technologies could always
rely on the PHOSITA’s knowledge to fill in information gaps omitted from
the disclosure.247 But in recent years the dichotomy has disappeared; the
Federal Circuit has vitiated the “single embodiment” enablement doctrine
and adopted a unitary (and more stringent) “full scope” enablement
standard.248 This is perhaps a judicial effort to reform the patent system by
making patents harder to obtain and easier to invalidate.249
Second and relatedly, full scope enablement is itself a heightened standard
than what was previously applied.250 Now the Federal Circuit is willing to
invalidate patents that previously would have survived an enablement
challenge. So, a case like Angstadt251—where a disclosure describing a handful
of compounds actually tested is purported to enabled a broad claim covering
thousands or millions of embodiments—might come out differently today.252
applicant’s application.”); see also Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (holding that a patent need only disclose a single embodiment to satisfy enablement).
247 In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“In cases involving predictable factors, such
as mechanical or electrical elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense
that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance
characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws.”), quoted in Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg,
Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
248 See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000-03 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (determining
that a disclosure which enabled video games did not support a broad claim that covered movies as
well as video games); Auto. Tech. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW, 501 F.3d 1274, 1283-85 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(determining that a disclosure which enabled mechanical side-impact sensors was insufficient to
support a broad claim encompassing both mechanical and electronic sensors because the two were
“distinctively different”); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (determining that a disclosure which enabled an injector with a pressure jacket was insufficient
to support a claim that covered injectors both with and without a pressure jacket); AK Steel Corp.
v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that when the claims covered
a Type 1 or a Type 2 aluminum coating, yet the patent only described a Type 2 coating, the claims
were nonenabled because a PHOSITA could not fill in the gaps without undue experimentation).
249 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 175.
250 See Dennis Crouch, The New Law of Enablement, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 22, 2007),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/03/the_new_law_of_.html [https://perma.cc/8REP-B3UZ] (“[The
question in Liebel] is an important question because most patent claims are written to literally cover
embodiments that are not fully enabled.”); Dennis Crouch, CAFC Continues to Expand Doctrine of Full
Scope Enablement, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 4, 2008), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/enablementcont.html [https://perma.cc/2L9A-4GGK] (“The ‘full scope’ doctrine has recently been applied by
the Federal Circuit to invalidate several patents.”).
251 See supra text accompanying notes 231–236 (discussing the Angstadt court’s concern that
too high an enablement standard would require an inordinate amount of disclosure, thereby
discouraging patent filing in the unpredictable arts).
252 See, e.g., Wyeth and Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(determining that “there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims, measured
at the time of filing, would require excessive experimentation” because the written description
“disclose[d] only a starting point for further iterative research in an unpredictable and poorly
understood field”); see also Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir.
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As noted by one commentator, “the Federal Circuit [has] aligned itself to the
rule that broad claim scope requires broad disclosure.”253
The Federal Circuit’s move toward full scope enablement means that what
would not have been an enablement issue in the past might be one now. So,
there should be less doubt that knowledge of inventive failure that comes to
light during patent prosecution—in light of the heightened enablement
standard—is material to patentability. And as I discuss in the next Part, this
knowledge requires action.
IV. CLAIMING AROUND FAILURE
Recall that an applicant has a duty to disclose any information that is
material to patentability of one or more pending claims in a patent
application.254 The duty to disclose “exists with respect to each pending claim
until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the
application becomes abandoned.”255 Bristol-Myers Squibb makes clear that
information about (non)enablement is material to patentability.256 Thus, I
contend that an applicant that learns post-filing that (some of) the claimed
subject matter does not work as described must, at a minimum, amend the
claims to avoid inequitable conduct.257

2014) (noting that, as in Wyeth, “the claims at issue here similarly cover potentially thousands of
undisclosed embodiments in an unpredictable field” but the written description only provides a
“starting point” for the PHOSITA).
253 Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Begins its Campaign for Patent Clarity, PATENTLY-O (June 26,
2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/federal-circuit-begins-its-campaign-for-patent-clarity.html
[https://perma.cc/U38B-DNQE].
254 See discussion supra subsection III.A.1.
255 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2015).
256 See MPEP, supra note 57, § 2001.04 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
257 See supra subsection III.A.3. This Article focuses on known failure that comes to light after
filing. If doubts about enablement arise before filing, one commentator provides advice:
The claims should not be written so broadly as to include nonenabled subject matter . . . . If
it is questionable whether anything within a broad claim would actually work in the
invention, it is advisable to break up the claim into two claims, one of which is limited to
operable and enabled subject matter, and the other of which is limited to [subject matter]
which the inventor is not sure will actually function.

JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION 6-78 (2005); see also ELLIS,
supra note 208, § 226 (advocating a similar strategy). The idea is that the narrow, enabled claim will
pass scrutiny by the Patent Office and survive an invalidity attack on enablement grounds.
SHELDON, supra, at 6-77; Einhorn, supra note 208, at 717-18.
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A. Simple Claims
To illustrate an amendment involving simple claims, consider again the
hypothetical introduced earlier.258 Recall that the inventor disclosed and
claimed four compounds W, X, Y, and Z that were purportedly effective for
treating arthritis. Recall that W had been made before filing and showed
promising results but the others had been disclosed prophetically.259 Suppose
the inventor filed the patent application with the following claims:
1. W.
2. X.
3. Y.
4. Z.
5. A method of treating arthritis comprising administering to a patient a
therapeutically effective amount of W.
6. A method of treating arthritis comprising administering to a patient a
therapeutically effective amount of X.
7. A method of treating arthritis comprising administering to a patient a
therapeutically effective amount of Y.
8. A method of treating arthritis comprising administering to a patient a
therapeutically effective amount of Z.

This claim drafting strategy is fairly typical.260 Note that the claim matrix
includes “composition of matter” claims directed to the compounds
themselves (claims 1-4) as well as (2) “method” claims directed to ways of
using the compounds to treat arthritis (claims 5-8).261
258
259
260

See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
See supra Section I.B (discussing prophetic disclosures).
Often the applicant will consider claiming the thing, how to make the thing, and how to
use the thing. SHELDON, supra note 257, at 6-77.
261 There are two principal reasons why a “composition of matter” claim covering the compound
itself tends to be more valuable than those directed to a specific “method of making” or “method of
using” the compound. First, the former affords the broadest protection. As Harold Wegner explains,
[Composition of matter claims covering the compound] have always been the
premium form of patent protection in the chemical industry . . . . A claim to the
compound, per se, dominates every method of making that compound and every single
use of that compound, every single mixture of different components that includes that
compound, and every end use composition inclusive of the compound.
HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS, AND
PHARMACEUTICALS § 260, at 301; see also In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (discussing
the “well-recognized advantages” of composition-of-matter claims); MARTIN A. VOET, THE
GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA & PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE
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Recall that post-filing experimentation reveals that X works as described
but Y and Z do not. Thus, the claims directed at Y and Z—claims 3, 4, 7, and
8—are nonenabled. Since nonenablement is material to patentability, the
claims cannot stand as originally filed—the applicant must amend them.
The type of amendment required depends on how the original claims were
drafted. The only option available for the foregoing claim matrix is
cancellation—striking the nonenabled claims from the application. Thus, the
examiner would only consider the patentability of claims 1, 2, 5, and 6.
B. Complex Claims
Complex claims are those which cover multiple embodiments of the
invention. If these embodiments share a common attribute, the applicant is
allowed to claim the invention with generic language. Generic claims abound
in patents.262 Below, I explain how they should be handled when post-filing
experimentation reveals that one or more embodiments do not work.
For a simple illustration, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose the
inventor develops a wood cleaner made from a solution of lemon oil, mineral
oil, and white vinegar in a 1:1:4 ratio. Testing reveals that the solution cleans
all wood surfaces including antiques, furniture, and kitchen cabinets without
drying the wood finish. Based on these results, the inventor files a patent
application. Although the application’s written description only discloses
experimental details for the lemon oil embodiment, it states that the
invention “is not limited to the example chosen; other citrus oils, including,
but not limited to, orange, lime, citron, and tangerine may be used.” The
application concludes with the following claim:
A wood cleaner comprising citrus oil, mineral oil, and white vinegar.

This is considered a generic claim because each embodiment of the
invention shares the common characteristic of a citrus oil as an ingredient.263

MANAGEMENT 82-85 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the “hierarchy” of patent claims and noting that
composition patents are the best for pharmaceuticals).
Second and relatedly, method patents are difficult to enforce because the patentee “acquires
only the right to preclude others from using the chemical in the exact manner he has disclosed.”
Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 768, 781 (1969); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2007) (“Patents on particular methods of treatment
involving the use of a drug are generally considered less valuable[] because they cannot be used to
stop competitors from selling the same product for other uses.”).
262 Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 61, at 145-46.
263 A generic claim “uses terms that define the invention to include a class of individual
embodiments, each of which shares one or more characteristics in common.” 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 4.65 (4th ed. 2012).
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Now suppose that post-filing experimentation reveals that grapefruit oil
does not work. In fact, mixing grapefruit oil with the other ingredients causes
the mixture to immediately putrefy.
The applicant cannot allow this claim to stand as filed because its full
scope is (known to be) nonenabled. So, the applicant must act. Cancelling the
entire claim would go too far because it would unnecessarily give up too much
(in fact, all) scope. The best option would be to add a negative claim limitation,
which is permitted by the courts and the Patent Office as long as it has basis
in the original disclosure.264 For example, the claim can be rewritten with an
exclusionary proviso:
A wood cleaner comprising citrus oil, mineral oil, and white vinegar, with the
proviso that the citrus oil is not grapefruit oil.

The amendment has a basis in the original disclosure, which describes
citrus oils. Importantly, the negative claim limitation works well for the
applicant because it only excludes the minimal amount of scope necessary to
satisfy the enablement requirement.
Of course, generic claims can be considerably more complex; particularly
in pharmaceuticals, chemistry, and biotechnology. To illustrate, suppose that
an inventor at a drug company develops a method for making a class of
estrogen modulators useful for treating breast cancer. The method requires the
reaction of a precursor with a magnesium compound with the generic formula
R—Mg—X, where R is an alkyl group (a functional group265 made up entirely
of carbon and hydrogen where the carbon atoms are chained together by single
bonds)266 and X is chlorine or bromine. As filed, the claim recites:
A method of making a chemotherapeutic comprising . . . reacting [the
precursor] with a compound of the formula R—Mg—X, wherein R is an alkyl
group and X is Cl or Br.

The claim is actually very broad in scope because there is an infinite
number of possible alkyl groups (methyl, ethyl, etc.).267 Thus, R represents a
264 In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588, 595 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cited in MPEP, supra note 57, § 2173.05(i)
(“The current view of the courts is that there is nothing inherently ambiguous or uncertain about a
negative limitation.”).
265 A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule with specific chemical properties
that represents a potential reaction site in a compound, thus determining a molecule’s chemical
reactivity. See generally RICHARD C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS
(2d ed. 1999) (providing examples of functional groups).
266 In chemistry, the symbol R is used to represent a generalized alkyl group. See PETER
VOLLHARDT & NEIL SCHORE, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 72 (7th ed. 2014).
267 See id. at 72-75. For example: methyl (one carbon, —CH3); ethyl (two carbons, —CH2CH3);
n-propyl (three carbons in a straight chain, —CH2CH2CH3), isopropyl (three carbons with a branch,
—CH(CH3)2), etc.
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large genus. This style of claiming—where a variable can encompass a large
number of alternative species—is ubiquitous in patent law.268
Post-filing experimentation reveals that two R—Mg—X combinations do
not work. For instance, (1) all reactions with R = ethyl fail to yield a product;
and (2) the reaction where R = methyl and X = Cl yields a product that shows
no anticancer activity.269 What should the applicant do? I contend that
knowledge of experimental failure requires action since the patent application
is still under review. The easiest way is to exclude the inoperable species with
an exclusionary proviso:
A method of making a chemotherapeutic comprising . . . reacting [the
precursor] with a compound of the formula RMgX, wherein R is alkyl and X
is Cl or Br; with the proviso that R cannot be an ethyl group and R cannot be a
methyl group when X is Cl.

Although it fair to say that claiming around failure can become tedious or
cumbersome for genus claims as the number of species increases, patent
applicants routinely use exclusionary provisos,270 perhaps most often to claim
around “prior art.”271 Regardless, the duty to act on known failure should not
depend on claim complexity.
V. DISCLOSING FAILURE IN THE PATENT RECORD
While amending the claims to cancel nonenabled subject matter would
satisfy the duty of candor and avoid inequitable conduct,272 it does not solve
the file drawer problem.273 Since an applicant does not have to give a reason
for amending or cancelling a claim, an applicant can comply with the law
while keeping the details of the experimental failure secret. Although the
268 See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (sanctioning the practice). It is
referred to as Markush practice. See In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 719-20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining
the history and current law of Markush practice).
269 If a compound is not capable of achieving the asserted use (anticancer activity in the case
of the hypothetical), the compound is unpatentable for a lack of utility under § 101. See In re Fisher,
421 F.3d 1365, 1370-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Such compounds also fail to satisfy the “how to use” prong
of the enablement requirement under § 112. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
270 For an example of a patent with several exclusionary provisos, see Hexa- and Heptapeptide
Anaphylatoxin-Receptor Ligands, U.S. Patent No. 5,387,671 (filed Dec. 27, 1990) (issued Feb. 7, 1995).
271 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(defining prior art as the “knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at
a given time, to a person of ordinary skill in the art”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (setting forth
the documents and activities that can serve as prior art); Tom Brody, Negative Limitations in Patent
Claims, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 29, 33-36 (2013) (exploring the use of exclusionary provisos and negative
claim limitations to avoid prior art). An invention is compared to the prior art in assessing novelty
and nonobviousness.
272 See supra Section III.A.
273 See supra Section II.B.
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claim amendments will prevent the applicant from obtaining a patent of
unwarranted scope, a decision not to disclose experimental failure means that
this information will not enter the public storehouse of technical knowledge.
This has many downsides for the patent system, including low-quality patent
examination, creation of nuisance prior art,274 and thwarted innovation.
Encouraging applicants to disclose information about failure in the
prosecution history—the public record of the patent proceedings—would
solve this problem.275
A. The Post-Filing Information Disclosure Statement
Adding information about experimental failure to the prosecution history
would be easy. Applicants already use a mechanism known as an Information
Disclosure Statement (IDS) to disclose information about the invention to the
Patent Office.276 Although the IDS is most often used to comply with the duty
of candor owed to the Patent Office,277 it can be used for a variety of other
reasons.278 And the submission, according to the Patent Office rules, “[would]
not be construed to be an admission that the information cited in the statement
is, or is considered to be, material to patentability.”279 This aligns with the Federal
Circuit’s view that “a patentee should not be ‘punished’ for being as inclusive as
possible and referencing his own work in an IDS.”280 Thus, the post-filing IDS
provides a convenient mode of publicly disclosing experimental failure without
the danger of the submitted information being used against the applicant. If
anything, as discussed below, the disclosure could actually help the applicant.281
274
275

See supra notes 53–54.
More specifically, the prosecution history “is the written record of an applicant’s dealings
with the [Patent Office], including any actions taken by the examiner, and any statements,
arguments, or modifications of the claims made by the applicant.” DURHAM, supra note 19, at 196.
The prosecution history contains the record of exchanges between the applicant and the examiner.
This includes any information submitted by the applicant or found by the examiner.
276 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97–1.98 (2015) (setting forth the requirements for filing an IDS and for form
and content of an IDS). An alternative approach would be to incorporate the details about experimental
failure directly into the patent document itself. But this is not as easy as it might seem. The so-called
“new matter” doctrine severely restricts post-filing amendments to the disclosure. When an applicant
amends the written description, the Patent Office instructs examiners to be on the alert for “new matter.”
See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2015); MPEP, supra note 57, § 706.03(o) (alerting examiners).
277 MPEP, supra note 57, § 609. For a discussion of the duty of candor, see supra Section III.A.
278 For example, the applicant can be transparent and just make sure that the examiner
considers the exact same information that the applicant considered. MPEP, supra note 57, § 609.
279 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(h), cited with approval in Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334
F.3d 1274, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
280 Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
281 See infra Section V.B. Another scholar has also proposed an expanded role of the IDS with a
potential upside for the applicant for additional disclosure. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a
Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 769 (2002) (proposing a regime in which an applicant
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B. Incentivizing Full Disclosure
While all would agree that disclosing negative results with an IDS is good for
the patent system, the next question is how to encourage inventor-researchers to
disclose them. There is little doubt that disclosure is the biggest hurdle for
capturing (and ultimately disseminating) negative information.282 Overcoming
this hurdle is difficult not only because of the file drawer problem,283 but also
because of differences between industrial and academic science,284 differences
within each of the two sectors (and across technical disciplines),285 and potential
trade secret concerns for researchers who change jobs.286 The challenge is to create

who provides an IDS that discloses all relevant prior art and discusses how it relates to the claims as filed
would receive a patent with a specific presumption of validity with respect to the disclosed prior art).
282 John T. Cross, Dead Ends and Dirty Secrets: Legal Treatment of Negative Information, 25
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 619, 620 (2009) (recognizing the disclosure problem).
Nondisclosure or selective disclosure is an enduring problem in patent law. Parchomovsky &
Mattioli, supra note 67, at 230-31; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
283 See supra Section II.B.
284 Henry Sauermann & Paula E. Stephan, Twins or Strangers? Differences and Similarities
Between Industrial and Academic Science 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16113,
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16113.pdf (“[W]e find significant differences between the two
sectors with respect to the nature of research, the use of various disclosure mechanisms,
organizational characteristics, and scientists’ preferences.”); see also DAVID B. RESNIK, THE PRICE
OF TRUTH: HOW MONEY AFFECTS THE NORMS OF SCIENCE 41 (2007) (describing the
traditional differences between industrial and academic science, including those related to research
independence, motivation, and the freedom to decide how and to whom data will be shared).
285 See, e.g., Sauermann & Stephan, supra note 284, at 3 (explaining that the differences between
academic and industrial practice is smaller in the life sciences than in the physical sciences); see also
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, The New World of Knowledge Production in the Life Sciences, in
THE FUTURE OF THE CITY OF INTELLECT 107, 107-18 (Steven G. Brint ed., 2002) (noting that
unlike other technical disciplines, in the life sciences there is no longer a distinction between basic or
applied research, academic or industrial practice, or proprietary or scientific approaches to
information disclosure); TAMAS BARTFAI & GRAHAM V. LEES, DRUG DISCOVERY 87 (2006)
(explaining that disclosure norms at pharmaceutical companies have evolved to openly and extensively
disclose positive results, in part to attract academic collaborators and reassure investors).
286 While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, the drafters of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act believed that negative know-how could be protected as intellectual property. See
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985) (defining “trade secret” to “include[]
information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of lengthy
and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could be of great value to a
competitor”). Negative know-how has been described as a “strange[] theory of trade secret
law . . . under which an employee who resigns and joins a different business can be liable for not
repeating the mistakes and failures of his or her former employer.” Charles Tait Graves, The Law of
Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 388 (2007). Graves argues that the
doctrine is “conceptually unworkable;” “bestows intellectual property rights in accidents, mistakes,
incorrect theories, failed tests, dead ends, and obsolete approaches;” and “[lacks] the usual
theoretical justification for intellectual property.” Id. at 388. To be sure, the case law is split in the
handful of states that recognize negative know-how. See ROGER MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§ 1.02[1] (2011) (collecting cases).
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specific, practical inducements which would motivate individual researchers to
disclose experimental failure.287
1. Examination Perks
Perhaps the most basic strategy for incentivizing disclosure is to give the
researcher something in return—a quid pro quo. Of course, this rationale
incentivizes the disclosure of information that the public might not otherwise
get.288 For the patentee, the incentive for full public disclosure of the invention
is the limited period of exclusionary rights.289 For the public, the exchange serves
the public good because the disclosed information enriches the public storehouse
of technical knowledge once the patent document publishes.290
One way to combat the file drawer problem is to provide applicants who
disclose failure with some perk during patent examination. Perks like fee
reductions291 and accelerated examination292 seem feasible because the Patent
Office and Congress already use such measures to achieve certain policy
objectives.293
But disclosing failure could confer an even more important benefit to the
applicant. It is no secret that applicants know more about their inventions

287 Cf. Patil & Siegel, supra note 97, at 522 (“[A]lthough the arguments in favor of [publishing
negative results] all seem to revolve around benefits to the community, the costs of [disclosure]
would fall on individual authors. If the community is to reap the benefits, then the costs to the
individual authors must be driven to zero—or associated with some reward.”).
288 EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE 143 (2002).
289 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The
disclosure required by the Patent Act is the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.” (quoting Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kewanee, 416 U.S.
at 480-81 (describing the quid pro quo that supports the patent grant as a constitutional objective).
290 See supra notes 55 and 72 and accompanying text.
291 For example, Congress has directed the Patent Office to reduce fees for independent inventors
and other small entities. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012) (mandating a fifty percent reduction). One
statutory objective of this perk is to provide incentives to invent and patent. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-382,
at 13 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1320, 1328 (explaining that “the small entity fee structure
is important to encourage innovation in the United States” because without it, independent inventors
“would be disinclined to protect their inventions because of a lack of resources.”).
292 See Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for
Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,323, 36,323 (June 26, 2006) (describing a program which
allows applicants to accelerate examination to one year).
293 See, e.g., Cancer Immunotherapy Pilot Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,328, 42,328 (Jun. 29, 2016)
(implementing a pilot program which offers fast track examination for applications claiming a
method of treating cancer using immunotherapy).
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than examiners,294 who tend to suffer from an information deficit.295 So an
applicant who is transparent about failure not only gives the examiner a more
accurate picture of the invention landscape,296 but does much to build a better
relationship with the examiner.297 The applicant’s ultimate benefit is the
possibility of more (or broader) allowed claims. The public benefits too, as
transparency and full disclosure lead to higher-quality patent examination
and, ultimately, higher-quality patents.
2. Defensive Publication
The ability to control the technological landscape can provide a strong
incentive to disclose negative results. For instance, disseminating negative
results helps coordinate the future development of technology by reducing
duplicative research efforts and providing technical fodder, which can spur
additional inventive activity.298 But this is only part of the story. Given that
negative results can potentially defeat patentability,299 their dissemination
can be used strategically to control the patent landscape around the disclosed
information. Thus, a research organization might engage in defensive
publication, which occurs when information is “intentionally made available
to the public as prior art in order to render any subsequent claims of invention

294 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 734 (2004) (explaining that applicants “know better than [the Patent
Office or] anyone else precisely what it is they have developed or invented.”); see also Abbott Labs. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that “the patent practice includes recognition
that the inventor usually knows more about the field than does the ‘expert’ patent examiner”).
295 Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, supra note 15, at 991-94.
296 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
297 Although patent examination is considered as a non-adversarial proceeding, the applicant
and examiner have different objectives. Whereas the applicant wants a patent with broad claims, the
“examiner ostensibly represents the public in ensuring that the patent applicant does not obtain
rights to information that properly belongs in the public domain under the patentability standards.”
Kelly C. Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV.
333, 346 (2007). Examiners carry out this task by ensuring that claims are “examined, scrutinized,
limited, and made to conform to what [the applicant] is entitled to.” Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix
Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877).
298 See infra subsection V.C.2.
299 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. For example, a prior art reference that discloses a
failed experiment can be used to support a conclusion that an invention lacks nonobviousness. Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Under § 103 . . . a reference need not be
enabled; it qualifies as a prior art, regardless, for whatever is disclosed therein.”). It is reasonable to
expect that a PHOSITA will turn to other references, in addition to knowledge and skill in the
relevant technical field, to fill in the technical gaps to make the invention with a reasonable
expectation of success. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 377 Fed. App’x 978,
982-83 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining in the § 103(a) context, though one reference was nonenabled, the
PHOSITA could have achieved the claimed invention through routine experimentation).
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or discovery ineligible for a patent.”300 With negative results, the expectation
is that publishing them will create an insurmountable obviousness hurdle
around the disclosed information.301
The importance of defensive publication as a strategic tool cannot be
overstated.302 Research organizations use it as a low-cost mechanism for both
preventing competitors from obtaining patents and for guaranteeing the
organization’s freedom to practice:
[A]s the costs of patent applications and litigation continue to rise[,]
defensive publishing is offering scientists another option: by making
published descriptions of their innovative research products available to the
public, they prevent others from patenting them, thus they ensure the results’
continued availability without incurring the significant legal and filing fees
involved in patenting.303

Thus, defensive publication can serve as a key element in a research
organization’s overall intellectual property management strategy.304
Venues for defensive publication abound. They include companygenerated prior art journals,305 commercial prior art websites,306 peer300 STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 24 (2003); see also Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a
Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173, 175 (2005) (explaining that defensive publications
“are designed to preempt patents in instances in which the disclosing firm does not itself plan to
pursue patent protection but fears that its rivals might.”).
301 Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 300, at 176. See also supra note 299.
302 See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2175, 2175-76 (2000) (discussing a firm’s strategic incentive to create prior art); Gideon
Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000); see also Bill Barrett, Defensive
Use of Publications in an Intellectual Property Strategy, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 191, 191-93 (2002)
(providing specific drafting strategies for creating prior art).
303 Stephen Adams & Victoria Henson-Apollonio, INT’L SERV. FOR NAT’L AGRIC. RES.
BRIEFING PAPER NO. 53, DEFENSIVE PUBLISHING: A STRATEGY FOR MAINTAINING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AS PUBLIC GOODS, at 2 (2002), http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll11/id/296
[https://perma.cc/D2C5-MN88] (citing Richard Poynder, On the Defensive About Invention, FIN.
TIMES (London) (Sept. 19, 2001), http://www.richardpoynder.co.uk/On%20the%20defensive.htm
[https://perma.cc/3M87-4HAG]).
304 Id. Indeed, defensive publication can be “a ‘spoiler’ tactic—you disclose your technology
without pursuing patent protection for yourself just to be sure that no-one else can have a patent
for it either.” Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING CREATIVITY
FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 89, 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003).
305 Famous examples include the Bell Laboratory Record, IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin,
Siemens Zeitschrift, and Xerox Disclosure Journal. ADAMS & HENSON-APOLLONIO, supra note 303, at
5. Companies often distribute the journals to the Patent Office and commercial databases. Id.; Baker
& Mezzetti, supra note 300, at 174.
306 The two most popular sites are Research Disclosure and IP.com. Research Disclosure, “the
industry standard defensive publication service,” asserts that “over 90% of the world’s leading technology
companies” have used its services. About Research Disclosure, RESEARCH DISCLOSURE,
http://www.researchdisclosure.com/about-research-disclosure [https://perma.cc/8C65-VPEX]. IP.com’s
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reviewed literature,307 and patent documents.308 These venues vary widely in
financial cost, the human investment required to prepare them, timeliness,
and accessibility.309 Clearly, the incentive to defensively disclose is
strengthened when the publication venue is cheap, easy to produce, timely,
and easy for the patent examiner to find during a prior art search.310 Since an
IDS easily satisfies all four criteria, it could easily become an attractive
medium for defensive publication.
C. Normative Implications
Admittedly providing incentives for patent applicants to disclose failure
is a challenge. Below I explain why disclosure of failure in the prosecution
history should become the norm.
1. On Patent (Examination) Quality
The Patent Office is often criticized for making awful patenting decisions
which lead to the proliferation of low-quality patents.311 Aside from being
invalid,312 patents that fail to meet the statutory standards of patentability are
often worthless and burdensome on the patent system.313
prior art database is “the first and largest online prior art disclosure service and the only one publicly
available.” See Who We Are, IP.COM, https://ip.com/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/X8AM-LTHN].
307 For a discussion of peer-reviewed literature, see supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
308 It is often forgotten that the patent document serves several key roles in the patent system.
Most prominently, the claims establish the boundaries of the patentee’s right to exclude, 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) (2012), which expires twenty years from the earliest effective filing date, § 154(a)(2). But in
addition, the disclosure (the written description and the drawings) of a patent or published patent
application can serve as prior art. Id. § 102(a). A patent is effective as prior art as of its filing date
and remains so forever (just like a book, a magazine, or any other printed publication). See id.
§ 102(a)(2) (providing that an invention is not patentable if it is described in a patent or patent
application by another inventor and effectively filed before the before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention). So the basic idea is to disclose information in the patent document but not claim
it. The disclosed-but-unclaimed subject matter will become prior art.
309 See ADAMS & HENSON-APOLLONIO, supra note 303, at 7 (presenting a table which compares
the various defensive publication mechanisms); see also Poynder, supra note 303 (explaining that the “$109
(£75) per document [cost] to publish on IP.com . . . compares very favorably with the $20,000 it costs per
patent application to file in key locations worldwide” (internal quotations omitted)). Another
consideration is whether the cost of defensive publication is cheaper than potential litigation. See HANSEN
& VANFLEET, supra note 300, at 24 (“[T]he costs (both personal and financial) of making a defensive
disclosure need to be weighed against the cost of not making that disclosure, specifically the costs of
challenging a patent that would not have been granted had the disclosure been made.” (citation omitted)).
310 Cf. ADAMS & HENSON-APOLLONIO, supra note 303, at 3-7 (listing the factors to consider
when choosing a mechanism for defensive publication; including accessibility, timeliness, and cost).
311 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
312 See supra note 7.
313 See supra note 8; Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent
System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 992 (2004) (explaining
that the costs of low quality patents “include entry deterrence of would-be innovators, a slower pace
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A high-quality patent examination requires good information about the
invention and the technological landscape.314 Several commentators argue that
one of the primary causes of the quality problem is that examiners lack adequate
technical information needed to perform a rigorous examination.315 Given that
examiners draw heavily from materials found in patent databases,316 there is a
good chance that examiners will overlook information not found there. This is
particularly problematic in nascent, rapidly-changing, or highly-specialized fields
where there is a paucity of relevant patent literature.317 So to the extent that
examiners are unlikely to turn to nonpatent literature in gauging patentability,
information that is not in the prosecution history will probably not be considered.
Technical information about failure is extremely important in gauging
patentability—specifically, in determining whether an invention is novel,
nonobvious, and enabled.318 Thus, moving toward a disclosure paradigm where
failure is disclosed in the prosecution history could dramatically improve patent
quality. And to be clear, disclosing failure in one case would not only be
considered in gauging the patentability of the invention claimed in that
application, but could be considered for other inventions in other applications.319
So the availability of an expanded universe of technical information (which
includes failure) would allow examiners to conduct a more robust examination
of applications and ultimately improve the quality of issued patents.
of innovation, and increases in patent application activity that are costly both to the firms and to
society”); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731 (2002) (explaining that legal actors often
must revisit the Patent Office’s work to assess patent validity).
314 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
315 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 139; see also Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 8, at
1500 (“[M]uch of the most relevant prior art isn’t easy to find—it consists of [third-party activities]
that don’t show up in any searchable database and will not be found by examiners in a hurry.”);
Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196
(2007) (“A high-quality prior art search is difficult because of resource and time limitations.”); John
R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 305, 318-19 [hereinafter Thomas, Collusion] (explaining that in newer technologies,
examiners often cannot obtain the most recent technical literature).
316 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 102 (2002) (“The predominance of citations to U.S. patents [as cited
prior art] may . . . reflect the limitations of the PTO systems for searching: the PTO is much more
likely to find documents that it itself has generated.”); Thomas, Collusion, supra note 315, at 318 (“In
comparison to much of the [non-patent] literature, patents are readily accessible, conveniently
classified and printed in a common format. Identification of a [non-patent] reference, and full
comprehension of its contents, often prove[s] to be more difficult . . . .”).
317 Thomas, Collusion, supra note 315, at 318-19 (“Overreliance upon patents as indicia of the state of
the art works far more mischief in fields long believed to be outside the patent system [like software and
other postindustrial inventions, where] the repository of issued patents insufficiently samples the prior art.”).
318 See supra note 2 (listing the substantive patentability requirements).
319 Cf. Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 67, at 230 (“It should be borne in mind that information
about failed research in a particular industry may be useful to inventors in other industries as well.”).
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2. On Technological Progress
Both patent law and science promote technological progress through the
dissemination of knowledge.320 For instance, in patent law there is hope that the
public will use the technical information disclosed in a patent document to
improve upon the invention, design around it, or to spur more innovation.321
Science contemplates that researchers will engage in similar activities upon
reading a technical publication.322 Of course, the two differ in their mechanisms
of knowledge transfer. Whereas patent law emphasizes the quick dissemination
of technical knowledge to the public323 (in part because of its indifference to
ancillary details like the inventor’s identity or acumen),324 science insists on
filtering knowledge through a legitimization process known as peer review.325
Thus, the two disseminate knowledge in related, though dissimilar, ways.
Yet the two spheres have much in common when it comes to the role of
disclosure in achieving certain objectives. For example, in both spheres there
is hope that the disclosed information will actually enrich the public
storehouse of technical knowledge.326 This is why, at a minimum, both patent
320 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,
97 YALE L.J. 177, 180 (1987). In particular, both mainstream science and patent law promote
disclosure through publication. Once in the public domain, there is hope that others will build upon
those results and engage in further research. See id. at 184. But Professor Eisenberg also points out
that to the extent that patent protection “limit[s] the ability of other scientists to use published
knowledge, intellectual property law has been perceived within the scientific research community as
conflicting with the traditional norms and rewards of science.” Id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017
(1989) (“Yet the idea that exclusive rights in new knowledge will promote scientific progress is
counterintuitive to many observers of research science, who believe that science advances most
rapidly when the community enjoys free access to new discoveries.”).
321 Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 51, at 632; see also MICHAEL A GOLLIN, DRIVING
INNOVATION 15-19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that
other creative individuals can use and improve upon).
322 Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 51, at 663 (citations omitted).
323 The statutory scheme helps achieve this goal. For example, a pre-filing disclosure generally
defeats patentability, although there are limited exceptions for disclosures made by or derived from
the inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). To aid in quick dissemination, most patent applications publish
eighteen months after filing. See id. § 122(b)(1)(A).
324 See Eames v. Andrews (The Driven-Well Cases), 122 U.S. 40, 56 (1887) (explaining that an
inventor’s ignorance of the scientific principles is immaterial as long as the patent’s disclosure sets forth
the “thing” to be done so that it can be reproduced); see also Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 F.2d 373,
376 (3d Cir. 1930) (“It is with the inventive concept, the thing achieved, not with the manner of its
achievement or the quality of the mind which gave it birth, that the patent law concerns itself.”); Earle v.
Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247) (Story, J.) (“It is of no consequence, whether
the thing be simple or complicated; whether it be by accident, or by long, laborious thought . . . that it is
first done [because the] law looks to the fact, and not to the process by which it is accomplished.”).
325 This process ensures that each research claim is reproducible, logical, independent, and satisfies
other basic conditions for communal acceptability. JOHN M. ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 246 (2002). For a
discussion of the mechanics of peer review, see supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
326 See supra note 55.
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law and science require a disclosure that teaches something that is novel,
nontrivial, and reproducible by skilled artisans in the technical field.327
The disclosure function works best when an inventor or researcher tackling
a given problem can get a complete picture of the relevant accumulated knowledge.
Knowing the lay of the land promotes the efficient allocation of resources.328
But concealment of experimental failure prevents this from happening in at least
two ways. First, other researchers might waste resources on duplicative efforts
(trying to develop something that has already been attempted—albeit
unsuccessfully) rather than working on more productive activities.329 Second,
ignorance of failure might lead some researchers to avoid risky endeavors or
those with uncertain outcomes and instead “be overly conservative, perhaps
even wasting societal resources on too-safe technology that might be spent on
other human endeavors or social needs.”330 In both patent law and science, this
waste impedes, rather than promotes, technological progress.
Advancing knowledge—and technology—via full disclosure is a firmly-held
goal shared by patent law and science.331 Disclosing experimental failure helps
achieve this goal because it provides substantive technical knowledge from which
others can learn.332 Recall that failed experiments always yield something—
whether it be a serendipitous result,333 an abundance of unexpected technical
data, or simply knowledge that an initial hypothesis was totally wrong.334 There
is hope that someone can extract knowledge from failure and use it to achieve
success with the failed experiment or for other creative purposes.335
327
328

Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 51, at 663 (citations omitted).
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 262-67
& n.79 (1994).
329 See supra notes 121–139 and accompanying text; F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents
and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 99-100 (2003) (describing
how disclosure can coordinate downstream activities, including the prevention of duplicative efforts).
330 Henry Petroski, The Success of Failure, 42 TECH. & CULTURE 321, 328 (2002).
331 See supra note 72; Bernice T. Eiduson, Psychological Aspects of Career Choice and Development in
the Research Scientist, in SCIENCE AS A CAREER CHOICE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES 3,
24 (Bernice T. Eiduson & Linda Beckman, eds., 1973) (“A scientist . . . is constantly reminded . . . that it
is his job to advance knowledge by some increment, large or small.”); ROBERTA NESS, THE CREATIVITY
CRISIS: REINVENTING SCIENCE TO UNLEASH POSSIBILITY 73 (2015) (noting that one of the noble
goals of science is “to advance knowledge for the good of society” (internal citation omitted)).
332 See supra Section II.A.
333 See FIRESTEIN, supra note 93, at 44-45 (explaining serendipitous discoveries that come
from failure; that is, “[s]omething doesn’t work the way you thought it should and exploring the
reasons for that leads to the initially unexpected and now surprising result.”). See generally Sean B.
Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009) (exploring accidental discoveries in patent law and
their alignment with the substantive law of invention).
334 See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text; Matosin et al., supra note 101, at 173
(explaining that research should be a “systematic, hypothesis-driven attempt[] to fill holes in our
knowledge,” which means reporting failure and developing a new hypothesis which “provide[s] an
explanation as to why we are seeing what we are seeing.”)
335 FETZER, supra note 95, at 16.
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CONCLUSION
It is perhaps inevitable that the Patent Office will issue patents that are
partially inoperable—that is, patents that claim some subject matter that does
not work as described. These patents contribute to the patent quality problem
and impose costs on the courts, competitors, would-be inventors, and society.
Scholars posit that fixing the problem would require more rigorous (and
costly) patent examination336 or perhaps heightened patentability
standards.337 But they have completely overlooked the paradigm presented in
this Article: when the inventor learns after filing that some of the claimed
subject matter does not work and chooses to conceal that information from
the Patent Office. When this happens, it is not at all surprising that a partially
inoperable patent will issue. There is every reason to believe that concealment
of inoperability is pervasive, thereby producing a countless number of issued
patents which disclose and claim failure.
But this cannot be right. Despite the murkiness of the relevant case law, this
Article has explained why an inventor cannot conceal known failure without
breaching a duty of candor and good faith owed to the Patent Office. The
inventor must act, at a minimum, by claiming around the failure. But the patent
system should also encourage inventors who learn about failure after filing to
add this information to the patent record. Such post-filing disclosures would
dramatically improve patent examination, reduce uncertainty (about what works
and what does not work), and make the patent document a more robust source
of technical information. Thus, this regime would ultimately improve patent
(examination) quality and promote broader goals of the patent system.

336 See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675,
706-07 (2009) (proposing an examination regime which allows the Patent Office to devote more
time and resources to applications in certain technologies); John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and
Patent Law’s “Cost Disease”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 490-98 (2013) (advocating an examination regime
that includes work sharing with foreign patent offices or privatizing or automating application
review). But see Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 8, at 1510-11 (arguing against investing more
resources in substantive patent examination as a means of improving patent quality because most
patents are never asserted, litigated, or licensed).
337 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 162-63 (exploring the decline in patent quality
and attributing the weakening of patentability standards to the Federal Circuit); JAFFE & LERNER,
supra note 1, at 11, 201 (same).

